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US e-grocers have been testing different business models with varying results. 
This research conducted a meta-analysis of six online grocers (Peapod, Tesco, 
Safeway, FreshDirect, Webvan and Streamline) to identify the pattern of strategies that 
contribute to their performance. Each company's management capabilities, expansion 
and market selection strategy, order-picking method, delivery method, website design 
and Customer Relations Management (CRM) are explored and compared to identify the 
factors that provide these businesses with a greater chance of success. The findings 
suggest that knowledge of and experience in the grocery business play an important 
role in the success of an online grocer. Using a cautious and slow expansion strategy 
helps an e-grocer stay in the game. The store-pick model is suitable for most markets, 
while warehouse-pick may be used for markets with high customer demand. Each 
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1.1 Introduction and Background 
An old Chinese saying goes like this: Food to the people is like people to a king. 
It means that just like a king has to rely on the support of his people to remain on the 
throne, ordinary people have to rely on food for survival.  The importance of food is 
universal, and the retail food industry is a vital part of the economic activity of every 
country. 
The food on America’s table is mainly supplied by supermarkets, hypermarkets 
and discounters. Americans are used to going to these traditional stores in person to 
buy groceries. With an increasing number of grocers now offer online ordering and 
home delivery of groceries, Americans are gradually changing the way they shop for 
groceries. Online grocery retailing is becoming more and more common.  
New start-up online grocery retailers such as Peapod and FreshDirect are in the 
market to compete with traditional supermarkets. Some of these new online grocers 
have support from traditional supermarket chains. Some are “pure-play” or stand-alone 
grocers that operate their own supply chains and facilities. Traditional supermarkets are 
also offering online ordering and home delivery to customers as a new distribution 
channel in a struggle to keep the market shares from being taken away by the new 
ventures. 
Online grocers utilize different operating strategies and business models. History 
has seen both successes and failures in this industry. Various aspects of online grocery 
shopping have been studied, but few studies have compared the successful and less 
successful companies in this industry to identify the characteristics that contribute to 
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these outcomes. By identifying these key variables, this study intends to look for 
business models that have a better chance of success.  
Once considered a symbol of the dot-com crash, the online grocery industry 
struggles to come back to life. Applying a sound business model and effective 
operational strategies is essential for the existing players in order to stay competitive 
and successful. New ventures that intend to join this business also need to come up 
with a promising plan. This study attempts to add to the body of knowledge and provide 
insights that might be helpful to these companies. 
1.2 History of Home Grocery Delivery 
Neighborhood grocery stores have, in fact, offered delivery services since the 
19th century. At that time, urban citizens, who did not own horses like the residents of 
rural areas, had groceries delivered to their home free of charge. Most of them did not 
own a car until the beginning of mass production of automobiles in 1914.  Fifty years 
ago, Americans were used to having milkmen deliver fresh milk to their doorstep each 
morning.  
In more recent decades, grocers have allowed customers to order and receive 
their food at home.  In the 1960s, third-party companies offered phone-in delivery 
services for groceries.  However, these services were usually short lived. Today’s 
shoppers are sensual shoppers who prefer to use their five senses in choosing their 
purchases. Groceries, especially food, are the kind of merchandise that shoppers would 
want to see, feel, smell, touch, and possibly taste in person before they make the 
purchase (Underhill, 1999). The convenience of driving their own family cars and being 
able to really touch and feel the food in big supermarkets made many customers 
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unwilling to take advantage of phone-in services. Lack of profitability has been the 
biggest problem for these grocery delivery services for vendors.   
 By the mid-1980s, some local grocery delivery services allowed customers to 
browse product listings and place orders by computer.  Marketing strategies used 
during this time, such as the focus on suburban families and the use of price promotions 
to attract new customers, would later surface again among the online companies of the 
late-1990s (“E-Commerce: Online,” 2004). 
 In 1989, Peapod, an online grocery business, emerged in suburban Chicago.  In 
the days before the World Wide Web, Peapod’s customers used proprietary software 
and a modem to dial into their systems in Chicago and San Francisco (“Background on 
Peapod,” n.d.). Peapod partnered with Jewel in Chicago and with Safeway in San 
Francisco to put together the orders to be delivered to customers (“Peapod company 
history,” n.d.). 
Afraid they were missing out on the market share occupied by Peapod, many 
grocery stores jumped on the bandwagon of home-based ordering and delivery in the 
1990si.  Safeway considered expanding their partnership with Peapod to cover a larger 
part of the Southwestern United States.  Other chains linked their catalogues to online 
content services like Prodigy and used their own employees to fulfill orders.  However, 
by the mid-1990s, it was clear many of the early expectations for the industry would not 
be met.  Grocery chains and stores discovered that online ordering and delivery were 
not profitable.  Peapod relied only on computer-based ordering and experienced 
growing demand.  Sales doubled every year (Funding Universe, n.d.); however, costs 
also rose, causing Peapod to suffer continuing losses and growing debt. 
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 Peapod saw the rise of new competitors like Streamline Inc. in suburban Boston 
in 1993.  Unlike Peapod’s partnerships with existing grocers, Streamline developed its 
own warehouses, as well as relationships with wholesalers and distributors.  Streamline 
delivered to their own boxes located in the garages of their customers (Borrego, 2001).   
By 1996, companies like Peapod, Streamline, and HomeRuns had created their 
own websites.  The World Wide Web had created a common platform in which these 
companies could build their ordering systems.  During the height of the Internet boom, 
investors poured money into these dot-com ventures.  Taking advantage of this trend, 
HomeGrocer and Webvan joined the field of competitors. 
Webvan was started in 1999, offering over 18,000 perishable and nonperishable 
items.  It built highly automated warehouses to process its orders.  Webvan allowed 
customers to schedule a 30-minute window for next-day grocery delivery (Feather, 
2001).  Webvan had attracted $1 billion of venture capital and had planned to 
aggressively expand into 26 cities. Founded in 1999, SimonDelivers was another online 
grocer. It serves the Minneapolis-St.Paul metropolitan area of Minnesota and Western 
Wisconsin (“SimonDelivers,” 2008).  
Expansion did not go smoothly for these new grocers, however.  Peapod was 
suffering cash-flow problems by 1999.  It wasn’t until Royal Ahold, a Dutch-based 
international supermarket operator, came to the rescue with $73 million in 2000 that 
Peapod was saved from collapse (Lerner, 2002).  By 2002, nearly all the leading online 
grocers (HomeGrocer, HomeRuns, Kozmo, Shoplink, Streamline, Urbanfetch, and 
Webvan) were gone.  The only survivors were Peapod and SimonDelivers. The online 
grocery industry was crushed.  Webvan was the most spectacular failure, having burned 
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through $1 billion of venture capital in just two years despite having what was once 
considered to be the model most likely to succeed (Porres, 2003).  Webvan’s 
subsequent failure caused many to lose faith in the idea of online grocery shopping 
altogether.  In the early years, overenthusiastic projections of the online grocery industry 
predicted it would cover as much as 20 percent of all grocery sales by the mid-1990s or 
2000.  Later, estimates by Forrester Research in 1998 toned down their forecasts, 
dropping their projections of 2004’s expected online sales to less than five percent of 
US grocery retail sales (“E-Commerce: Online,” 2004). 
Rising from the ashes of the online grocery failures were more cautious ventures 
in the online world.  A scaled-down Peapod, with backing from Royal Ahold, was joined 
by brick-and-mortar grocers now testing the online waters. Although experiencing some 
financial difficulty, SimonDelivers weathered the dot-com boom and bust by securing 
$15 million in funding and focusing on its local market instead of expanding nationwide 
(Tellijohn, 2000).  
1.3 Factors Driving the Popularity of Online Grocery Shopping 
In today’s busy world, the time available for grocery shopping is scarce. 
Americans now work more and thus have less free time. According to a 2008 ranking by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Americans are 
among the hardest working people in the world with 1,797 work hours on average each 
year (Olson, 2008). For families with children, having to take the kids to the market adds 
to the stress of the chore. Due to competing demands on their time from work and home, 
people are more likely to shop for groceries online. Many disabled people rely on online 
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grocery services to fill their refrigerators and because of the quickly aging US population, 
more elderly people are also likely to be interested in e-grocery shopping.  
With Peapod operating in the Midwest and East Coast, FreshDirect in New York 
City, Albertsons and Safeway in the West, Simon Delivers in Minnesota’s Twin Cities 
area and Shnucks in St. Louis, Central Illinois and parts of Southern Indiana (Fishman, 
2005), this revived e-grocery industry has both new and old players that are now 
attempting to stake out their shares of the online grocery market and working hard to 
achieve what their predecessors could not. (See Appendix A for a complete list of 
current US online grocers.)  
Scott and Scott (2008) report the following figures regarding the current market 
size and potential of selling groceries online. The estimated online grocery revenue was 
$235 million in 1998, $2.4 billion in 2002 and $6.2 billion in 2006; Jupiter research 
estimates that the percentage of US online grocery sales will rise to 1% by 2009. Manor 
(2006) stated that industry analysts estimated US online grocery sales would reach $4.2 
billion in 2006, up 27 percent from 2005. Despite still being less than one percent of all 
grocery purchases, online grocery sales are expected to double by the end of the 
decade. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
Many consumers welcome the option to shop for groceries online, but they are 
not yet ready to abandon the traditional in-store method of shopping.  Many still 
consider online grocery shopping too expensive, mostly due to the high delivery 
charges. Since customers are not able to pick out produce themselves, grocers must be 
able to convince customers that they are choosing only items of the desired quality.  
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The logistics of going from the customer making an order to delivery at an agreed upon 
time requires a great deal of effort. 
Many new companies, as well as traditional grocers, have attempted to provide 
electronic grocery shopping to consumers.  Various different approaches to establishing 
infrastructure, fulfilling orders, and making deliveries have been tried.  Margins are very 
thin; surviving in this industry is tough.  Many failed companies litter the history of the 
industry.  Grocers are desperately searching for the best formula for success. 
1.5 Purpose of This Study 
Although grocery delivery is not a new idea, the electronic grocery shopping 
business is underdeveloped and still in a nascent stage. This is a very challenging 
business, yet it offers extraordinary opportunities. Despite the efforts made by the e-
grocers to implement various service concepts and the interest of consumers in online 
grocery, not much research has been done in this area.  The purpose of this study is to 
identify successful operating strategies that can be employed by online grocers and less 
successful strategies that should be avoided. 
1.6 Major Research Questions of the Study 
This study will attempt to understand the factors contributing to online grocery 
success by finding answers to the following research questions: 
• How should an online grocer’s management function to ensure its success? 
• How should an e-grocer expand its business and decide its target market? 
• How should an e-grocer put together orders? Should it use central warehouses 
or the shelves of physical stores? 
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• How should an e-grocer deliver orders to customers and achieve operational 
efficiency? 
• How should an online grocer’s website function, and how is customer relations 
management handled? 
1.7 Significance and Limitations 
The importance of the online segment in the overall retail food industry will be 
determined in the years to come.  Although it presently only accounts for one to two 
percent of food sales in the US, market share of online grocery shopping may increase 
due to social and demographic drivers and technological and operational improvements. 
It has the potential to account for a major percentage of retail food sales if business 
strategies are chosen wisely in the right environments.  Alternately, it may be relegated 
to the fringes of the grocery industry if the right business choices are not made. 
There have been many casualties in the history of the e-grocery industry. 
Today’s survivors and newcomers are all hoping to find the strategies for success. By 
performing case studies on the successes and failures of a group of selected online 
grocers, this study hopes to find answers to the major research questions stated above 
and put together a big picture view of the industry.  Some of these companies are still 
operating, while others have failed.  Various aspects of their business strategies will be 
compared, and an effort will be made to distill the characteristics of these businesses 
that led to their success or downfall. 
This study intends to help the online grocery business learn from the mistakes of 
the past so that they can increase market share in the future. 
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The study will be limited to e-grocers that offer online ordering and home 
delivery/pick-up service with product selections similar to a traditional supermarket—
specialty food grocers and companies with restricted selections (such as dry food only) 
will not be examined.   
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is made up of five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction/thesis 
proposal. It gives a historical overview of the e-grocery industry, presents the problem 
and states the importance of the study. Major research questions are also identified in 
this chapter. 
The second chapter is the literature review which describes the target market of 
online grocers. The customer base will be reviewed based on demographic, geographic 
and psychographic characteristics. The literature review also provides information about 
the state of the market following a chronological and geographical order.  The 
operational aspects of how different e-grocery businesses complete a typical 
transaction will be described as well. 
The third chapter presents the methods used. This study will primarily be an 
inductive qualitative analysis of the e-grocery industry. This research consists of case-
studies of successful and not-so-successful e-grocers. A meta-analysis will be 
performed to compare various aspects of the e-grocers’ strategies in an attempt to 
identify patterns and variables that contribute to their varied success levels.  
The fourth chapter analyzes data. The fifth chapter confers research findings and 
draws conclusions. It also offers possible directions of future research. 
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 The goal of this chapter is to lay out the operational and strategic groundwork for 
the analysis. E-grocers employ different business models. To make their business 
models work, online grocers use various strategies and target different markets. Each 
operational model varies along several dimensions, such as how orders are placed, 
assembled and delivered. The first part of this chapter presents statistics and 
descriptions of the electronic grocery industry in chronological and geographical order. 
The second part of this chapter presents a review of the online grocery industry’s 
customer base and target market. The third section describes the process of completing 
an online grocery transaction and how each business model functions differently to fulfill 
orders. The fourth part of this chapter offers opinions from previous studies regarding 
the factors contributing to the varied outcomes in the e-grocery industry.  
2.1 Industry Overview 
Americans are familiar with grocery home-delivery services. This concept has 
been around in one form or another for decades. In the early days, when not many 
people had a fridge at home, milk needed to be delivered to customers daily. Milk 
delivery often occurred in the morning while people were still asleep. Glass bottles or 
cartons were left at the doorstep. Milkmen even delivered other dairy and farm products, 
such as eggs, cream, yogurt and butter (“Milkman,” 2008). Although demand for the 
service decreased significantly during the past 50 years, some people still prefer the 
old-fashioned way of getting their milk as they think milk tastes better in glass bottles. 
The milk delivery business is actually regaining some of its lost ground. The United 
States Department of Agriculture saw three-to-five percent of milk sold in the US 
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delivered to homes in 1995, compared with only one percent in 1993 (Shih, 1995). In 
the 1950s, groceries could be ordered over the phone and delivered to a customer’s 
kitchen within an hour or so, free of charge (Underhill, 1999).  
 American grocery stores used to carry only dry grocery items, such as flour, 
baking soda, dry beans and canned foods. People bought fresh produce and meat from 
specialty food retailers like butchers and greengrocers. These stores were often located 
near one another for shoppers’ convenience. Starting in the 1920s, chain grocers 
experimented with consolidating smaller stores into larger ones with meats and produce 
along with the dry grocery items. As a result of this consolidating process, by the 1950s, 
there were much fewer neighborhood stores but more larger supermarkets and 
shopping centers that people had to drive some distance to go to (“A quick history,” 
n.d.). Fewer grocers offered home delivery after this period, as Americans enjoyed 
driving their family cars to shop in large, well-decorated supermarkets and spending 
some leisure time at the urban and suburban shopping centers. 
Even before the World Wide Web ever existed, getting groceries online was 
made possible by dialing into grocers’ servers with special modems provided to 
customers. Independent online ordering and home-delivery grocery companies like 
Peapod began to emerge in the US retail food industry. Food retailers like these were 
referred to as pure-play e-grocers because they only sold groceries online and had no 
storefronts. The development of the web provided a whole new platform for online 
ordering of groceries. More pure-play e-grocers jumped into the market. Among these 
companies were Streamline, HomeRuns, HomeGrocer, Kozmo, Shoplink, Urbanfetch, 
Webvan and SimonDelivers. Fearing of missing out on the market share occupied by 
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pure-play e-grocers, traditional supermarkets also began to offer grocery delivery 
service. For example, Sandoval (2002) described Safeway’s reentry into home-delivery, 
with experienced UK major e-grocer Tesco by its side. (In 1990, Safeway had started a 
delivery service, but discontinued it after just two years.) From the emerging of Peapod 
in 1989 to Webvan’ s grand entry in 1999, the online grocery retailing industry seemed 
to be very promising.  
 Industry expectation for the e-grocery sector was optimistic at the time. 
According to LeClaire (2002), Forrester predicted that 14 million households would 
eventually buy at least some of their groceries online.  Jupiter predicted that sales would 
reach $11 billion in a few years.  Datamonitor reported that the online retail food and 
beverage market in the United States was worth $2.1 billion in 2001 after growing 43.5% 
that year (“United States – Online,” 2002).  The growth rate slowed from a high in 1999, 
when the market had grown by 131.6%.  Datamonitor predicted the value of the market 
to increase to $49.9 billion by 2007 (“United States – Food,” 2003).  At the time, 
Webvan accounted for 30.9% of the market volume, followed by Peapod with 28.3% 
and GroceryWorks with 12.7%.  
However, problems with customer retention and revenue generation in the pure-
play businesses led to a big shakeout in the US online grocery industry. Most of the 
independent online grocers shut down their websites permanently by 2002. Only 
Peapod and SimonDelivers weathered the dot com crash and survived. Brick-and- 
mortar stores continued to offer online grocery service and soon took the lead. Later 
came some new players into the market. FreshDirect (founded in New York City in 2002) 
was one of them. 
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2.2 Customer Base/Target Market 
2.2.1 Demographic Characteristics 
According to Buy4Now, an internet shopping service, 80% of online grocery 
shoppers were 29 to 50 years old in 2002. Seventy-four percent (74%) of the 
respondents were female shoppers (“Typical Customer Profile,” 2008).  According to 
eGroceryUSA.com (“Typical Customer Profile,” 2008), three categories of people are 
the major users of online grocery services: affluent shoppers pressed for time, families 
with young children, and people who can’t easily get to the store. The first category is 
people who have higher incomes and less time. These shoppers are usually 
technology-savvy, heavy internet users who are single or have a dual-income family 
with no kids. These big spenders prefer to pay someone else to do grocery shopping for 
them. The second group consists of families with young children. They comprise the 
largest number of online grocery shoppers. A typical e-grocery shopper in this category 
is 29-to-50 years old with one or more children and at least one child under the age of 
five. They normally would cook family dinners, and, therefore, are regular grocery 
shoppers with above average spending. People in this category expect to save time and 
avoid the hassle of dragging kids along for grocery shopping (“Typical Customer Profile,” 
2008). The third group is relatively small compared to the first two. They are older or 
disabled people and those who find going to a grocery store difficult.  People are living 
longer than ever. In 1960, life expectancy of the US population was only 69.7. The 
number increased to 73.7 in 1980 and 77 in 2000. The projected life expectancies for 
the years 2010 and 2015 are 78.5 and 79.2 respectively (U. S. Census Bureau, n.d.). 
Older people may need some form of help with grocery shopping when it becomes 
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difficult for them to drive to supermarkets and carry heavy items home. Online grocery 
shopping can be a good alternative to hiring personal helpers. For disabled people and 
others who are physically challenged (temporarily injured, bed-resting, etc.), online 
ordering and home delivery of groceries would also be of great help.  
2.2.2 Geographic Characteristics 
Sandoval (2002) quoted analyst Robert Rubin saying that average American 
cities are less densely populated compared to ones in the UK, which means high fuel 
costs will hurt even more when it comes to grocery delivery.  Rubin believed Americans 
are more likely to drive to the grocer because of the more entrenched car culture. The 
UK (248 per sq. km) had 8 times the population density of the US (31 per sq. km) in 
2004 (“World Population Prospects,” n.d.). Tesco has been having a relatively 
successful online grocery operation in the UK. This led to the idea that US online 
grocers should aim their target at large urban areas with higher population density for 
more potential customers.  
In these urban centers, people reside closer together. Less people own family 
cars in large cities. The dependence on public transportation, more crowded shopping 
environments, busier lifestyle and higher income make many urban residents favor 
online grocers over personally going to traditional grocery stores. According to 
Mclaughlin (2005), Richard Braddock, who was appointed chairman of FreshDirect.com 
in 2005, mentioned that FreshDirect would look for cities that are similar to New York to 
expand its business. Those are cities with a high percentage of internet usage, a high 
number of residents per square mile, and residents with a good deal of disposable 
income. He suggested that FreshDirect would not expand to the whole surrounding area 
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of New York. Instead it would expand from one urban population center to another to 
make sure its delivery trucks could make as many deliveries as possible every time they 
stopped.  
2.2.3 Psychographic Characteristics 
Fox and Kempiak (2006) pointed out that out of MyWebGrocer’s five critical 
elements that decide whether a consumer shops for groceries online (price, ambiance, 
convenience, service and product variety), e-grocers have advantages in ambiance, 
convenience, and service. Fox and Kempiak stated that changing family structures and 
increased work hours have made consumers busier, more time-starved, richer and 
more impatient with time-consuming tasks like grocery shopping. Because of these 
social and attitudinal changes, many people are more likely to be attracted to 
convenient, dependable alternatives for the recurring chore of grocery shopping. This 
makes the e-grocery service more appealing for consumers that fit this profile. 
Consumers with certain disabilities that make in-store grocery shopping hard are 
another major market for e-grocers. 
The ease of shopping from home and the time saved are two of the reasons 
some prefer buying online. Gennifer Calise, a working Manhattan mom, admitted that 
she would not want to lug her ten-month old son to the grocery store and lug him back. 
Instead, she can stay home and play with him on the floor and be clicking online at the 
same time. With both a child and a full-time job, she said she did not want to do 
anything that wasn’t easy (Koeppen, 2006). Similarly, Sietsema (2007) stated that those 
who worked long hours at the office and had little time for everyday life were delighted 
to be able to not have to go to a grocery store. 
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  Anckar et al. (2002) stated that the ability to shop from any place, at any time, 
was an undeniable convenience offered by e-commerce.  The status of grocery 
shopping as an undesirable chore for many people makes it ripe for online efforts that 
can offer both speed and convenience.  Time and convenience have been cited as the 
principal reasons for purchasing groceries electronically in a study by Morganosky and 
Cude.  With the technology available online, general purpose grocers can easily 
become specialty grocers tailored to the individual needs of customers with allergies 
that require a special diet or people with different food preferences, like organic, ethnic, 
religious, or gourmet items.  
Scott and Scott (2008) state that by changing and reusing previous shopping lists 
online, consumers save time. Customers become familiar with the e-grocer’s website 
fairly quickly. The average ordering time is only 20 minutes versus 60 minutes when a 
customer shops online for the first time. The benefits of buying groceries online include 
the ability to establish, save and modify shopping lists online over time, emailing 
shopping lists to other family members, getting personalized coupons, sorting items 
according to nutritional information provided and automatically ordering all the 
ingredients for a certain recipe. 
Bates and Lauder (2008) pointed out that customers are often not loyal to just 
one particular retailer. They can be loyal to several retailers at the same time. These 
retailers share the spending of each customer. Therefore, the goal of competition 
becomes maximizing the wallet share a retailer could possibly get from each customer. 
Offering online grocery shopping to customers as a new distribution channel has the 
potential to gain a greater wallet share for a grocer.  
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 Bates and Lauder (2008) also believed that the market adoption rate is another 
influencing factor that decides how many customers an online grocer can attract. 
Customers adopt online grocery services at different rates and at different times. Due to 
Webvan’s failure and the dot com meltdown in 2000, the natural evolution and adoption 
process were set back for years, both for potential customers and for grocers. Bates 
and Lauder used the figure in Appendix B to show the adoption process being extended.  
 Fox and Kempiak (2006) brought up some major concerns that prevent some 
consumers from choosing to buy groceries online. These concerns included delivery 
time and methods, quality of produce, a limited variety of goods, and the security and 
privacy of online shopping. Anckar et al. (2002) considered the fear of receiving low- 
quality goods to be a potentially important obstacle to purchasing food online. Some 
customers fear that store employees may not pick the freshest produce in an attempt to 
minimize storage losses or maximize picking speed.   
While some people consider grocery shopping a burden, there are still a lot of 
food lovers who enjoy their trips to traditional grocery stores to actually touch and hand-
pick everything they are buying. Online grocery shopping is just not the right experience 
for them, and, therefore, does not satisfy their needs.  
When Scott and Scott (2008) described the resistance to online grocery shopping, 
they mentioned that customers may not be willing to pay the delivery fee. It is also hard 
to change the established shopping habits of consumers. Customers might not like the 
long lines at the registers of traditional grocers, but that does not necessarily mean they 
are ready to give up standing in them right now. The cost involved in the acquisition and 
retention of customers tends to be high, because once consumers have a negative 
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online grocery shopping experience, they may not buy groceries online again and tell 
their acquaintances not to try the experience. 
2.2.4 Technological Characteristics 
The internet makes online grocery shopping viable. According to Fox and 
Kempiak (2006), the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) indicated that 86% of US 
consumers go online or use their computers every day. Seventy percent (70%) of them 
shop online frequently. While in the UK, broadband use is ranked number two in Europe 
and number five in the world.  This has been a boon for online businesses in the UK 
15.9% of the respondents of this research bought groceries online at least once a year. 
3.2% used e-grocers at least once a week. 2.7% used them two or three times a month.  
4.5%, the largest group, used an e-grocer once or twice a year (“E-commerce: The 
Internet,” 2007). The increasing rate of internet usage likely contributes to the rising 
number of consumers who purchase groceries online. 
According to Foley et al. (2003), online shoppers actually had habits different 
from their unwired counterparts.  Online grocery shoppers made fewer shopping trips 
per month (for all goods) and spent more per trip than those who did not shop online.  
Online orders tended to be larger than in-store purchases.  At Tesco, for example, in-
store purchases averaged £21 (about $33), while online orders averaged £85 (about 
$136). Online shopping households averaged nearly $10,000 more in annual income 




2.3 e-Grocery Shopping Process and Various Business Models 
 The process of buying grocery online consists of several major steps. They are 
ordering and payment, order-picking/ assembly and order delivery/ pickup. (Appendix C 
shows the process of e-grocery shopping in a figure.) Although all e-grocery 
transactions have these basic activities, e-grocers vary in how they carry them out.  
2.3.1 Online Ordering 
A consumer who intends to buy groceries on the web would first go to an e-
grocer’s website to enter the zip code of the intended delivery address. The e-grocer’s 
website would tell the consumer whether home delivery or in-store pick-up is available 
for the address or surrounding areas. If the service is available in the area, the customer 
is directed to the proper page where he/she can register with the e-grocer and create an 
account. Then he/she can start to browse product selections and choose delivery time 
slots. 
E-grocers’ websites often offer multiple ways of finding what a consumer wants. 
For example, a consumer can use the search button to search for a particular item. 
Alternatively, the e-grocer may offer an option to search for multiple items on a 
shopping list simultaneously. A page will appear that allows the customer to type in 
what he or she wants. The shopper can either search brand names or general item 
names. On the search results page, the customer can further browse all the items found 
and make a decision. The website may also allow browsing selections by aisle. All 
categories/aisles are displayed, each containing items of different brands. A consumer 
can also store shopping lists on the website and modify the lists anytime. Items on each 
list can be automatically added to the virtual shopping cart. Many e-grocer websites also 
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offer recipes to allow customers to add all ingredients of a certain recipe to the shopping 
cart with a click of a button. Weekly specials are easy to find, often on the home page. 
E-grocery shoppers also need to decide whether they want the groceries to be 
delivered or picked up from a store/warehouse if this option is available. Customers pay 
for the entire order using their credit or debit cards. 
2.3.2 Order Picking 
Once an online order is received by an e-grocer, the items will typically be picked 
and put together before midnight the day before the scheduled delivery/pick-up date. 
Order picking methods are different. Some e-grocers have built their own automated, 
independent warehouses to store and pick orders. Each warehouse may cost millions of 
dollars to build and offers high picking-efficiency with miles of carrousels sending bins of 
products through different picking zones. For example, Webvan built highly automated 
central warehouses which cost $35 million each. These futuristic warehouses had 
motorized carrousels and robotic product-pulling machines to help increase picking 
efficiency and offset delivery costs (“Webvan finds that,” 2001). Others pick orders in 
traditional supermarkets. Some have supermarket employees use specially-designed 
carts to pick orders directly from the shelves of traditional grocery stores. Some pick 
orders from a backroom attached to a supermarket. This method is less efficient than 
warehouse picking, yet with less order volume, picking from stores often offers more 
flexibility and less upfront cost to an e-grocer. For example, Webvan’s Oakland 
warehouse, which was capable of handling 8000 orders a day, would need at least 
3000 orders to break even. Yet it only processed 2160 orders a day in 2001. Running 
far below its designed capacity meant that it was actually losing money every day 
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(“Webvan finds that,” 2001). The items in each order are then separated according to 
their different temperature requirements and packed into different boxes or totes for 
delivery and pick up.  
2.3.3 Order Delivery/Pick Up 
 Orders that are packed will be transferred into delivery trucks or a room for pick 
up. Temperature-controlled delivery trucks are used for groceries delivered in ordinary 
boxes and bags. Some e-grocers use insulated bags/boxes with dry ice or ice packs to 
keep groceries at the right temperatures.  
 Deliveries are made according to the methods chosen by customers while 
ordering. Some are unattended deliveries. The customer does not need to be home to 
receive groceries. The order can be left in a designated area outside of the residence in 
insulated containers. The area is often out of direct sight from the street to avoid theft. 
Some companies, such as Streamline, owned reception boxes and rented them to 
customers to use in households for unattended delivery. Shared reception boxes at a 
shared pick-up point near the consumer were also offered by some e-grocers 
(Kamarainen, n.d.). For attended deliveries, someone needs to be home during the 
chosen window of delivery to sign for the delivery. Delivery drivers can help bring items 
directly to the customers’ kitchens. Pick-up services are available from some e-grocers 
in longer time frames. Customers would need to go to the e-grocer’s facility, either a 
supermarket or a warehouse, to collect their orders.  
 Research indicated that the way e-grocers get goods to customers has a great 
impact on the efficiency of the entire business model. Using reception boxes could 
mean a major cost advantage over attended delivery. The cost can be over 40 percent 
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less when reception boxes are used, because of the wider delivery window made 
possible by the reception box. Delivery routes can be better planned and delivery 
workloads can be better distributed during the day to minimize costs due to the wider 
delivery window (Kamarainen, n.d.). Having a reception box involves some cost for an 
e-grocer and its customers. Using insulated containers or insulated bags is another way 
utilized by e-grocers to offer unattended delivery, but collecting delivery bins adds to the 
cost.  
 Time slots for attended delivery are pre-selected by customers at the time of 
ordering. Some time slots are shorter and more popular and thus are offered at a higher 
delivery fee to level out demand peaks, which are mostly during late afternoons and 
weekends.  
2.3.4 Business Models 
While there are strategic variations within each business model used by different 
e-grocery companies, there are two predominant models in the online grocery business. 
Pure-play model — Pure-play e-grocers are companies that do business only 
online, without any connections to brick-and-mortar retail outlets. They operate their 
individual websites. Automated warehouses are built for order picking. They order food 
items directly from farms, dairies and fisheries to get fresher goods at a lower price or 
order from middlemen. Goods are stored, picked and assembled in central warehouses 
which are designed for efficient order picking and packing. Some e-grocers using this 
model can even custom prepare food to order right on the premises (“Our promise: 
higher,” n.d.). Deliveries are made from the warehouses, or orders can be picked up 
from their central location. Some pure-play e-grocers offered reception boxes installed 
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outside of customers’ residences for order delivery. Companies using this model include 
Webvan, Streamline, and FreshDirect.  
 Brick-and-mortar (B&M) model — Online grocers that use this model are 
traditional “brick-and-mortar” supermarkets adding an online shopping service. They 
utilize the buying power and suppliers of the supermarkets. Goods would come from 
suppliers to the shelves or backrooms in a traditional supermarket. Then designated 
pickers who are employees of traditional grocery stores would assemble orders for 
online customers. E-grocers using this model often have several stores as designated 
order-fulfillment stores. Each region has such a store to take care of order picking. 
Deliveries are made from these stores to their customers in the surrounding area. Brick-
and-mortar e-grocers include Safeway, Albertson’s, and Tesco in the UK.  
 Some companies pursue a combination of both of these two business models. 
For example, Peapod uses the brick-and-mortar model in most markets by working with 
subsidiaries of Royal Ahold. However, in Chicago and Washington, D. C., Peapod 
operates two free-standing warehouses for order picking and deliveries (“PEAPOD LLC 
Corporate,” n.d.). 
2.4 Opinions from Previous Studies 
The success level of e-grocers varies. Some have disappeared completely. 
Some of them remain operating in limited regional markets. Some of them are already 
serving multiple markets nationwide. Some claim they have reached profitability. Some 
are just hanging on while continuing to lose money. There have been multiple 
explanations offered by analysts for the success or failure of e-grocers, but no 
consensus has been reached. 
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2.4.1 Factors for Success 
Various researchers expressed their opinions on the factors that have a positive 
influence on the operation of e-grocery businesses. 
One proposed success factor is experience in food retailing and possession of a 
strong brand name already familiar to shoppers.  Traditional grocers already know the 
food retail business. They have established relations with suppliers and a large amount 
of buying power. Customers already shop in their physical stores. Mitchell Rhodes, 
president of GroceryWorks (the online division of Safeway), believed that the online 
division was valuable for promoting the grocer's brand (Guynn, 2003). Conversely, Fox 
and Kempiak (2006) and LeClaire (2002) believed that the brand helped promote the 
online division of the brick-and-mortar grocer. Fox and Kempiak also agreed with 
LeClaire that the past business experience and infrastructure of brick-and-mortar 
grocers were great advantages. 
Another factor contributing to success in the e-grocery business is believed to be 
the ability to spend the most for the longest. Regan (2002a) believed that even with the 
new model of tying online ordering to brick-and-mortar stores, it will still be the company 
that can spend the most for the longest that will emerge the winner.  While Tesco has 
succeeded in the UK, tailoring its system for the US will take time and money.  Given 
enough time and money, even the failed pure-play groceries may have succeeded.  
According to Regan, the competitive landscape of today’s online food retail market 
remains the same in that it will belong to the company that can stay in the game the 
longest.  If the Internet division of an established grocer is dragging down profits, its 
parent company may not let it continue for very long, which means they are no safer just 
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because they are tied to profitable businesses.  Without demand for these services, this 
new wave of online grocers will follow the previous wave into failure. 
Good customer retention strategy is also important to an e-grocer’s success. 
Consumers complete 60 percent of their shopping within a single grocery chain.  To 
capture the loyalty of customers, e-grocers need to reward shoppers who stay with 
them.  Vigoroso (2002a) reported that Safeway will give online customers access to 
their in-store purchases. Customers will also be able to earn savings awards and United 
Airlines miles.   
Cautious investment strategy and growth plan are the key. Brick-and-mortar 
stores utilize their existing infrastructure to save on costs. Delaney-Klinger, Boyer, and 
Frohlich (2003) stated that Tesco succeeded where Webvan failed because it marketed 
its online division as a value-added service and charged extra for delivery, which served 
to make up for the part of the costs of getting the ordered goods to the customer (pricing 
strategy).  Though Tesco’s strategy of putting together orders at their stores meant a 
higher cost per order than Webvan because of the lower picking efficiency, it was more 
suited when sales volumes were lower. Mike Patton, president of the Northern 
California division of Albertsons, illustrated a cautious strategy when he stated that 
Albertsons was moving into areas with the greatest amount of Internet usage and with 




2.4.2 Factors for Failure 
Some factors may have a negative influence on e-grocery businesses. Low level 
of customer demand for e-grocery was a problem found by many analysts. Sandoval 
(2002) mentioned that analyst Robert Rubin thought online-only businesses were 
doomed to failure because only a quarter of online grocery customers order more than 
once per month.  There was simply not enough customer demand to sustain the size of 
the investments needed to start delivery businesses. Pure-play grocers spent huge 
amounts of money on building highly-automated warehouses only to find that these 
warehouses were operated at half of their capacity. Order volume was simply too low to 
make their businesses profitable. According to Anckar et al. (2002), Ring and Tigert 
believed that one of the reasons for the failure of pure-play online grocers was because 
pure-plays greatly overestimated the demand for Internet-based grocery retail. 
High start-up cost was blamed for many pure-play e-grocers’ failure. According to 
Delaney-Klinger et al. (2003), although in theory warehouse-based grocers could cut 
costs related to providing a better shopping atmosphere for customers and design 
storage to maximize order-picking efficiency, the strategy required expensive 
expenditures of capital that in the short run increased the cost of business, whereas 
using existing stores to put together orders meant lower initial costs. High start-up cost 
resulted in being heavily leveraged and at a higher risk. 
Another factor for failure suggested by analysts was that the management of 
some e-grocers did not have sufficient experience and knowledge in food retail 
business. Alsop (2001) believed the reason for Webvan’s failure was less a problem 
with its concept and more a problem with its management.  Management problems 
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started at the top when Webvan hired a consultant (George Shaheen from Andersen 
Consulting) as CEO instead of someone with experience in food retail.  
Irrational spending was another factor contributed to failure. According to Alsop 
(2001), Webvan’s spending patterns were more in line with that of the dot com mania of 
the time rather than the disciplined frugality of real groceries. For example, it embarked 
on a rebranding campaign after just two years and repainted its delivery vans, spending 
money that was not directly related to making the business work.  Webvan was building 
too many facilities before it had figured out all the problems with their design and, 
therefore, was forced to reconfigure every warehouse instead of first fixing the problems 
in one warehouse before building any others and then applying the experience 
afterwards to build in efficiency from the start. Webvan’s ambitious plan of expanding to 
26 markets in a short period of time also sped up its failure. Fox and Kempiak (2006) 
expressed their concerns with the pure-play online grocery business model. They 
pointed out that today’s lack of capital investors for these dot com ventures make it very 
difficult for these independent pure-play e-grocers to survive. 
Research also indicated that some pure-play companies relied too much on 
technology. They did not concentrate on building a relationship with customers or 
establishing a consistent company image. Traditional supermarkets have advantages in 
this area (Lunce, Lunce, Kawai and Maniam, 2006). Lunce et al. (2006) also pointed out 
that Webvan shouldn’t have re-branded (by switching from a grocery service to a 
general delivery service) two years into its existence and wasted previous marketing 
campaigns. Webvan did not attempt to offer any incentives to encourage the usage of 
unpopular delivery time slots until very late in its business downfall. Webvan’s later 
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decision to sacrifice product quality to cut costs also further weakened its bond with its 
main customer population.  
2.5 Summary 
So much has been said about various business models and companies. 
Researchers have looked into many specific aspects of e-grocery business operation, 
but to date, no one has systematically compared these organizations to identify 
characteristics and strategies that contributed to these outcomes.  
The online grocers provide a service that many consumers welcome. The 
potential of this industry is still yet to be reached. JupiterResearch, a market research 
firm, predicted online grocery sales will grow by 17 percent in the next five years and 
reach $7.5 billion by 2012 (“Online Grocery Sales,” 2008).This study is intended to be 
useful to food retailers in the e-grocery industry, as well as to those contemplating entry 






 In the previous chapter, various operational aspects of e-grocers were identified. 
This chapter covers the methodology and data analysis. 
3.1 Research Approach and Method 
 The research design of this study took a qualitative, inductive approach to data 
collection and analysis. Case studies from secondary source material were analyzed to 
detect patterns of e-grocers’ business models and strategies, which will be used to 
develop a grounded theory of success factors in the e-grocery business. A meta-
analysis of selected e-grocers/cases was performed to reach this goal. 
3.1.1 Case Study Method 
Experiments, surveys, archival analysis, historical analysis, and case studies are 
the five major investigative strategies used in social science research. According to Yin 
(2003), there are three conditions that distinguish the five research strategies: the kind 
of research question asked, the degree of control the researcher has over actual 
behavioral events, and the amount of emphasis on current, as opposed to past, events.  
Case study is a qualitative approach to carry out scholarly research. In general, it 
is desirable to use case studies as the strategy when “how” or “why” questions need to 
be answered, when the researcher doesn’t have much control over the events, and 
when studying a current phenomenon within a real-life scenario (Yin, 2003). Also, it’s 
used when conducting exploratory research, which lacks the benefit of 
conceptual/theoretical frameworks. 
This study intends to investigate how the e-grocery businesses survive in difficult 
market conditions. It also wants to understand why the major current players in the e-
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grocer business have managed to continue operation, while many others have failed.  In 
addition, during the process of conducting this study, although the cases can be chosen, 
the actions of the companies or the strategies they are utilizing are not directly 
controlled by the researcher. Furthermore, this research studies the e-grocers’ 
strategies under the current conditions of the market. For these reasons, the case study 
method is the best fit for this research. 
3.1.2 Meta-Analysis 
This study is a qualitative meta-analysis of case studies of selected e-grocery 
companies. Answers to the set of major research questions described in section 1.6 
provided the qualitative data from each individual case (Lyons, 2003). The data 
accumulated across the cases/e-grocers were then analyzed to find possible 
relationships between the strategies/business models and the different outcomes of 
these e-grocers.  
No single case can be considered a definitive example of the success or failure 
of e-grocers.  Because there are a variety of business models featuring many different 
strategies, this study drew data from a wide range of cases. The meta-analysis method 
utilized the qualitative data gathered from multiple e-grocers to look for patterns of 
common operational characteristics and strategies among successful and unsuccessful 
e-grocery businesses. This systematic approach of making cross-case comparisons of 
the various business practices that led to varied results is appropriate for this study.  
There are some drawbacks to the meta-analysis method. For example, since the 
meta-analysis relies on the data from multiple cases, the quality of the analysis depends 
on the quality of data from each source, something which cannot be controlled by the 
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researcher. While some companies may have been using similar strategies, they are 
rarely identical. The details within each aspect being examined might vary. There is no 
common agreement on the approach to analyzing data for a meta-analysis (Graney and 
Engle, 1990). This study relies on a good deal of historical data from various resources. 
Efforts were made to use information corroborated by multiple sources. Each major 
research question deals with one specific operational aspect of an e-grocer. These 
research questions define the criteria of interest in the case studies.   
3.2 Cases/e-Grocers Examined 
 As Huberman and Miles (2002) noted, selection of a proper population helps the 
control of extraneous variation and sets the limits for the generalization of the findings. 
The case selection should not be random, as this is neither necessary nor preferable. 
Each case has been chosen to carefully provide a replication of other cases, to expand 
growing theory or to present examples of theoretical categories and polar types. Such a 
theoretical sampling, instead of statistical sampling, offers a foundation for the analytic 
generalization of theories in a case study. Each research question deals with a set of 
characteristics of an e-grocer.  Because each case examines a single company 
according to the characteristics indicated by the research questions, these 
characteristics become units of analysis embedded in the case study. This is illustrated 
in Appendix D (Yin, 2003). 
 This study examined several e-grocers, which included both relatively successful 
and unsuccessful companies. Since most of the e-grocery companies are private 
companies that do not publicly disclose their financial data, and the public listed brick-
and-mortar grocers do not separately disclose the financial data of their main operations 
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and online divisions, the relative levels of success were judged based on each 
company’s years in business, whether it has reported profitability, whether it is currently 
expanding or its percentage of market share. 
Online grocery retailing is now offered in many parts of the US (“Who Is Offering,” 
n.d.).  Currently, most online grocers are still operating with a limited geographic scope. 
Only a few names stand out when we count e-grocers that are apparently healthy and 
expanding. Among them, Peapod has been in e-grocery business for 19 years. It 
survived the dot com crash and is going strong with an annual growth rate of over 25 
percent. Peapod currently delivers to 1,500 zip codes and over 12,700,000 households 
in metro areas in the Midwest and along the East Coast (“PEAPOD LLC Corporate,” 
n.d.). According to Safeway’s 2007 Annual Report, Safeway Inc. is one of the largest 
food and drug retailers in North America, with 1743 stores in the Western, Southwestern, 
Rocky Mountain, Midwestern and Mid-Atlantic regions of the United States and in 
Western Canada, as of December 29, 2007 (Safeway, Inc., n.d.). Safeway now delivers 
e-groceries in 9 states in the US It offers a wide variety of both perishable and non-
perishable items. Pure-play e-grocer FreshDirect first introduced its service in New 
York City in 2002 and gained popularity quickly.  Now it has become a major player in 
the New York and New Jersey online grocery business and has achieved profitability 
(Schoenberger, 2006). In the UK, Tesco, PLC operates the world’s largest online 
grocery service. It has over 30% of the UK grocery market, approximately equal to the 
total share of the next two largest chains (Asda and Sainsbury’s) combined (“Tesco,” 
2008).  In 2002, Tesco was the first grocer to make online operations profitable 
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(Cheyfitz, 2003). Peapod, Safeway, FreshDirect and Tesco are relatively successful in 
today’s e-grocery retailing industry. 
Webvan was the most spectacular failure of US online grocery business. It 
burned through $1.2 billion in its short life span of 2 years and filed for bankruptcy in 
2001. It offers many lessons to be learned by researchers and the businesses still 
operating today. Streamline.com Inc. was the second to enter the US e-grocery retail 
business (the first was Peapod). Its operation lasted for 7 years until it closed its 
business in 2000. Despite of being one of the pioneers of US online grocers, Streamline 
was a pure-play e-grocer that was never able to break even, making the company 
unable to secure the capital needed to remain in business (McCormick, 2000). Webvan 
and Streamline are two examples of e-grocery failures. 
   Peapod, Safeway, FreshDirect, Tesco, Webvan and Streamline are the firms 
examined in this study. The combination of successful and not-so-successful e-grocers 
was chosen to help this study find a winning combination in today’s online grocery 
retailing industry. Sources of data include annual reports and other data made public by 
the companies involved, news and trade articles, published studies, and industry 
research.   
3.3 Data Analysis 
According to Booth (2001), a qualitative meta-analysis is very different from a 
quantitative meta-analysis. Commonly used analysis techniques of quantitative meta-
analysis (such as the use of software like Meta-stat) are not suitable for qualitative 
meta-analysis, because qualitative analysis is not primarily concerned with statistical 
exactness or representativeness. No attempt was made to sample or represent all views 
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on the topic, but rather specific cases were found that possess characteristics relevant 
to the issue being studied in order to identify patterns and any possible “noise” which 
may lead to competing theories. 
Previous sections of this study discussed operational aspects of the e-grocers. A 
set of research questions was used to identify the relevant operational aspects. These 
characteristics are the information that was extracted from each case examined.  
The data were then put into a matrix for comparative purposes; patterns of 
common criteria and strategies among successful and unsuccessful businesses were 
subsequently identified. Particular attention was paid to any sign of disconfirming 
evidence that may lead to different explanations.  
3.4 Validity and Reliability 
The type of validity that is relevant to qualitative, inductive research is face 
validity. It involves showing the research to people who are very familiar with the 
research topic and ask whether the findings/grounded theory are accurate. If they 
agree that the research looks sound, researchers can be reasonably certain that the 
study has achieved an acceptable level of face validity. If possible, the researcher would 
share the findings with professionals or experts in the e-grocery business and get their 
reactions to test the validity of this research. 
Reliability refers to the consistency of the study’s results. Another researcher 
following the same procedures and looking at the same e-grocers should be able to 
reach the same conclusions. This study will make efforts to document and present its 
data in a way that allows reviewers to follow the inductive approach of this investigation.  
However, in case studies of e-grocers’ operating behavior and performance, many 
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factors will be constantly changing. For example, business models and competitive 
strategies may change when the market conditions change or when major technological 
advancement occurs. This research was performed within the contemporary time frame 
and the context of present online grocery market conditions. This may limit the ability to 







In this chapter, each case (individual online grocer) is examined for factors 
implicated in business model success or failure. The data are analyzed to find any 
patterns that appear.  
A summary of the data collected is presented first.  Section 4.1 investigates the 
online grocery companies’ management competencies; Section 4.2 examines the major 
strategic expansion and market selection decisions they made; Section 4.3 focuses on 
logistics and examines how the companies handle inventory control and order fulfillment; 
Section 4.4 examines delivery strategy; Section 4.5 evaluates web design and customer 
relations management; and Section 4.6 compares strategies across the cases. The 
findings of this research will be presented after conducting a cross-case analysis of data.  
4.1 Management Core Competencies 
 This section looks into the experiences and knowledge in e-grocery business or 
in general traditional grocery industry each e-grocer’s management team possesses 
and how this affects managerial decision making. 
4.1.1 Peapod 
Peapod was founded in 1989 by brothers Andrew Parkinson and Thomas 
Parkinson in Evanston, IL. The Parkinson brothers combined their backgrounds in 
consumer product marketing and technology and started Peapod to serve busy families.  
At first, customers had to use Peapod-provided software and modems to dial into 
its shopping system. From 1990 to 1996, Peapod operated its business by fulfilling 
orders through partnerships with local grocery stores. It has worked with Jewel Food 
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Stores in the Chicago area, Safeway in San Francisco, the Kroger Company in 
Columbus, Ohio and Stop & Shop in the Boston metro area.  
In 1997, Peapod launched its own website www.peapod.com on the internet. 
Peapod listed its shares on NASDAQ through a successful initial public offering. Years 
2000 and 2001 were crucial for Peapod’s growth. In June 2000 Netherlands-based 
international grocer Royal Ahold took 51% ownership of Peapod. Marc Van Gelder 
joined Peapod from Stop & Shop, a subsidiary of Royal Ahold, to be the president and 
CEO. In August 2001 Peapod became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ahold and started 
a long-term exclusive partnership with Royal Ahold-owned grocery stores in the US.  
In 2003 Peapod achieved profitability in four out of five markets. Later, Andrew 
and Thomas Parkinson were re-appointed as Peapod’s President and CFO. Today’s 
Peapod, having the grocery industry know-how from Royal Ahold combined with 
infrastructure support through Royal Ahold’s physical stores, has achieved an annual 
sales growth rate of over 25 percent and has become one of the most prosperous 
online grocers in the United States (“PEAPOD LLC Corporate,” n.d.).  
4.1.2 Tesco 
Tesco is a UK-based international grocer and general merchandising retail chain. 
It was founded in 1919 by Jack Cohen. Tesco now has turned from the simple stall in 
the East End of London into the largest British retailer with profits exceeding £2 billion 
worldwide. As of March 2008, Tesco has a store in every postcode district of the United 
Kingdom with the exception of Harrogate. 
Tesco.com was officially launched in 2000 to offer groceries online. Tesco.com 
now completes over 250,000 online orders each week (Tesco, 2008). Its service has 
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been popular and profitable. It is the largest online grocery service in the world. The 
strength of Tesco.com lies with its well-established supplier and distributor network. Its 
tremendous buying power as the biggest player in the UK grocery industry, mature 
infrastructure consisting of near 2000 stores and an unbeatably wide range of products 
have helped it become a successful online grocery pioneer. 
4.1.3 Safeway  
Safeway has been in the grocery business for nearly a century. M.B. Skaggs 
bought a single tiny grocery store from his father and expanded his business to 428 
Skaggs stores in 10 states. He later merged his company with 322 Safeway stores and 
listed Safeway on the New York Stock Exchange in 1928. According to Safeway’s 2007 
Annual Report, as of December 29, 2007, with 1743 stores in the Western, 
Southwestern, Rocky Mountain, Midwestern and Mid-Atlantic regions of the United 
States and in Western Canada, Safeway Inc. is one of the largest food and drug 
retailers in North America. 
When it comes to offering online grocery shopping, Safeway utilizes its extensive 
network of distribution, manufacturing and food processing facilities and stores to 
provide infrastructure support. It also learned from the most successful UK online grocer 
Tesco through a prior alliance venture together. In summer 2001, Safeway made a deal 
with Tesco, Britain’s biggest grocer, to start its online grocery shopping service in the 
United States. Tesco brought its technology and proven online know-how into an online 
grocer named GroceryWorks, which was majority-owned by Safeway. GroceryWorks 
became the exclusive channel of Safeway’s online grocery service under the names 
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Safeway.com, Vons.com and Genuardis.com. It became Safeway’s wholly-owned 
subsidiary in 2006.  
4.1.4 FreshDirect 
FreshDirect was founded by Joe Fedele, a co-founder of Fairway Market, and 
Jason Ackerman, a former investment banker who specialized in the grocery industry. 
FreshDirect first introduced its service in New York City in 2002 and gained 
popularity quickly.  Now it has become a major player in the New York online grocery 
business and has achieved profitability. 
FreshDirect learned its lesson from online grocers that failed before and 
assembled a management team that has grocery, restaurant and financial experience. 
FreshDirect gets its food directly from farms, dairies, and fisheries to eliminate 
middlemen. The result of an efficient supply chain is fresher food at lower prices (up to 
25% less than supermarket prices) (“FreshDirect Is,” 2008). Since FreshDirect has no 
retail location, the company does not pay expensive rent for retail space. Many products 
can be custom-prepared for each order at its Long Island warehouse. 
4.1.5 Webvan 
Webvan was the poster child of failed dot com businesses. Founded in the late 
1990s by Louis Borders, co-founder of the Borders bookstore, Webvan enjoyed all the 
advantages the heyday of the dot-com boom had to offer, yet still ended up filing for 
bankruptcy in 2001. 
Webvan was able to secure a large amount of capital with its revolutionary idea 
of completely changing the way Americans buy groceries. At the time of its bankruptcy, 
Webvan had burned through $1.2 billion in financing.  
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George Shaheen, Anderson’s CEO at the time, joined Webvan in the fourth 
quarter of 1999 and became Webvan’s CEO. None of Webvan’s senior executives or 
major investors had any management experience in the supermarket industry. 
According to Louis Borders in an interview with Business Week (“We’re Building,” 1999), 
Webvan “studied Amazon.com as a benchmark for a good shopping experience, looked 
at Yahoo! as a benchmark for speech, relied on eBay as a benchmark for community, 
and CNN as an example of great content.”  
4.1.6 Streamline 
Streamline was founded in 1993 by Timothy A. DeMello, a former stockbroker. 
Timothy A. DeMello served as the Chairman and CEO of the company. Streamline.com 
Inc. was the second pure-play e-grocer to operate in the US. In June, 1999, the 
company completed an initial public offering of its stock (NASDAQ: SLNE), raising 
approximately $45 million to fund its expansion plans. 
In the last two years of its operation (1999 and 2000), Streamline tried to bring in 
more executives who had experience in food retail or national store rollout 
(“Streamline.com Announces,” 2000).  In September, 1999, Streamline hired Edward 
Albertian as President and C.O.O.; prior to joining Streamline.com, Albertian worked for 
Star Markets Company, one of the premier regional food retailers in New England. He 
also handled Staples Inc.’s rapid store expansion plan throughout the US while he was 
the Senior Vice President of Eastern Operations at Staples Inc. In 2000, Streamline 
added Rod Sturchio to its executive team. Sturchio had more than 30 years of 
experience in grocery retail operations and store rollout. Streamline shut down its 




Peapod, Tesco, Safeway and FreshDirect’s management teams all have 
knowledge and experience in grocery business. Having a background in the grocery 
business and knowledge of grocery supply chain and distribution are important to an e-
grocer. The e-grocers who failed (Webvan and Streamline) had knowledge of dot.com 
or general retail business, but not specific knowledge of food retailing. 
4.2 Expansion and Market Selection Strategies 
This section examines the markets targeted by e-grocers, characteristics of 
target markets, and e-grocers’ strategy to expand market share.  
4.2.1 Peapod 
According to Peapod.com, Peapod delivers to over 12,700,000 households and 
1,500 zip codes. It serves multiple metro areas. The markets vary in population density, 
but all the current locations Peapod serves are the metro areas that have physical 
grocery stores owned by Royal Ahold, an international supermarket operator based in 
the Netherlands. 
Peapod takes small steps when it comes to expansion. In 1990, Peapod began 
test marketing to about 400 households in Evanston, IL.  Only after the Evanston 
market became a success did Peapod expand service to the surrounding suburbs and 
Chicago. This continues to be their expansion strategy (see Appendix E for the list of 
Peapod delivery areas and its expansion timeline).   
Typical Peapod customers are dual income couples and dual income families. A 
wide range of people are identified as their customers: "dual career couples stocking up 
on basics for their families, time-starved professionals seeking the convenience of 
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prepared foods, epicures in search of natural, organic, and specialty fare, new parents 
with a need for baby products or personal health and beauty aids, singles who prefer to 
not have to lug heavy shopping bags, and even office managers who want to offer their 
employees snacks without wasting staff time shopping in stores” (“Peapod Brings a,” 
n.d.) 
4.2.2 Tesco 
Tesco.com offers grocery delivery to most UK residential areas (“Grocery help,” 
n.d.).  Tesco has expanded its online operation to the Republic of Ireland and South 
Korea (Tesco Annual Review, 2008). 
The UK (248 per sq. km) had 8 times the population density of the US (31 per sq. 
km) in 2004 (“World Population Prospects,” n.d.). In Great Britain, a large population 
lives closer together. Many families do not own a car. It is hard to take heavy items 
home after shopping for groceries. 
Tesco.com added its online grocery service slowly to its existing brick-and-mortar 
stores. Since Tesco.com builds its online grocery service on its physical stores, it 
manages to expand with limited investment. Note that Tesco.com opened its first online-
only store in 2007 for its expansion into a high-demand area without many physical 
Tesco stores.  
According to Cooper (2007), Tesco’s service is liked by a wide range of 
customers, including families with young children, people that consider going to a 
physical store challenging and those who just want the convenience shopping online 
offers. Even price-conscious shoppers like Tesco’s e-grocery service. 
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As of 2007, Tesco.com has an active customer base of 850,000. Tesco’s online 
grocery service appeals to people who do not own a car, are recovering from surgery 
and are unable to leave home and busy young families (Tesco Annual Review, 2008). 
4.2.3 Safeway 
Safeway.com delivers to residential locations along the East and West Coasts in 
the US (see Appendix F for Safeway delivery areas). Safeway’s markets vary in 
population density. They all have Safeway-owned physical stores. The Safeway.com 
and Vons.com online grocery services expanded slowly and carefully instead of 
aggressively like the previously failed online grocers like Webvan (“Safeway.com Finds,” 
2002). Safeway.com’s online grocery service expands as Safeway’s brick-and-mortar 
stores expand.  
 Safeway emphasizes busy lifestyles among its customers and targets consumers 
who are willing to pay extra to have their groceries delivered to avoid heavy traffic and 
congested commutes. 
4.2.4 FreshDirect 
FreshDirect delivers in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens, as well as select 
areas of Staten Island, and Westchester and Nassau counties. The company also 
delivers in Riverdale, Jersey City, Hoboken, and several New Jersey townships along 
the Hudson River. FreshDirect also delivers to corporate offices in Manhattan with a 
service called “FreshDirect At The Office.”  Through the pickup service offered at its 
warehouse, anyone in the Tri-State area can enjoy FreshDirect.com’s service.  
FreshDirect focuses its service where it started—the New York City (N.Y.C.) 
metropolitan area, with nearby communities gradually added to its delivery zone.  
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The N.Y.C. metro area has the following characteristics:  a large population 
concentrated in a tiny area; much less competition from traditional supermarkets; and 
most of the grocery stores are small corner stores. Carrying groceries home is difficult 
because many people do not have cars. There is a large, relatively affluent population 
that is willing to pay for premium groceries; N.Y.C. has a population accustomed to 
having “everything” delivered (Nishino, 2007). 
In New York, FreshDirect expands slowly and with caution. New customers were 
added block by block or even building by building, until word-of-mouth caught on. For 
expansion outside of New York, Fresh Direct is aiming at cities with similar 
characteristics as New York City: high internet use, dense population, and affluent 
residents. FreshDirect will not try to cover the whole surrounding area of a city; instead, 
the company refers to “move from population center to population center” (McLaughlin, 
2005).  
FreshDirect now has over 250,000 customers, and this number is growing fast. It 
targets the large number of potential customers in the New York metropolitan area who 
are affluent, short on time, and who consider the environment of tiny local grocery 
stores to be unpleasant. Manhattan’s corporate offices that need catering services for 
meetings and events are also important customers of FreshDirect. Corporations that are 
willing to offer convenience for employees are also identified as potential customer 
sources. 
4.2.5 Webvan 
At its peak, Webvan offered service in ten markets in the US: San Francisco bay 
area, Dallas, San Diego, Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, Portland, Atlanta, Sacramento, 
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and Orange County. These cities are typical mid- to large-size cities in America. The 
population density of each city varies. 
Webvan tried to use the Amazon.com model by expanding quickly. The company 
had originally hoped to expand to 26 cities. Starting from San Francisco, Webvan 
planned to reach across the US. In 1999, Webvan announced it was moving into 
Chicago, Dallas, Washington, DC and Seattle. It expanded into Atlanta in May, 2000. 
The company acquired HomeGrocer one month later. When the business was not doing 
well, the Dallas and Atlanta outlets were closed to cut costs in 2001.  
As of June, 2001, Webvan’s active customer base was 761,000 (“Webvan 
Adopts,” 2001). The company vowed to set a new standard for internet retailing. 
Webvan aimed to attract the technology-savvy shopper, the time-starved people, and 
the affluent shopper. 
4.2.6 Streamline 
Streamline.com Inc. served suburban areas of Boston, Chicago, Washington DC, 
and New Jersey. The population density in these markets varies. In June, 1999, the 
Company completed an initial public offering of its stock (NASDAQ: SLNE) raising 
approximately $45 million to fund its expansion plans. Streamline had an aggressive 
national expansion strategy to be in the top 20 US markets by the end of 2004.  
Streamline provided busy suburban families with time-saving lifestyle solutions 
through Internet-based ordering of groceries and a wide range of other quality goods 
and services. By offering thousands of leading brands and local services to satisfy busy 
suburban families’ multiple retail needs, Streamline enabled them to spend more time 
doing other things they enjoy more (“Streamline.com Launches,” 2000). The company 
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also provided targeted research and marketing services to many consumer goods 
companies nationwide. 
4.2.7 Summary 
The e-grocers all seek to target customers who are relatively affluent, short on 
time and prefer convenience. People who are physically challenged are also potential 
users of e-grocers. Among the more successful e-grocers, Peapod, Tesco and Safeway 
offer e-grocery services in markets with varied customer densities, while FreshDirect 
only focuses its business in the high customer-density market of New York City and its 
surrounding areas. They all use a slow and cautious growth strategy. Both of the two 
failed e-grocers (Webvan and Streamline) expanded their businesses aggressively and 
delivered to multiple markets with different customer densities. 
4.3 Order Fulfillment Strategies 
This section examines the type of order fulfillment strategy each e-grocer uses. 
Two basic strategies are employed in order fulfillment: using store shelves and using 
central warehouses.  
4.3.1 Facilities and Technology 
4.3.1.1 Peapod. Peapod uses a combination of store fulfillment and warehouse 
fulfillment. The company runs 16 warerooms attached to Royal Ahold stores. Each has 
approximately 7,000 square feet. Chicago is served by a 75,000-square-foot climate-
controlled central distribution center (that had once belonged to Streamline.com) in 
Lake Zurich.  Another 75,000-square-foot warehouse serves the Washington, DC area 
from Gaithersburg, MD. 
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4.3.1.2 Tesco. Tesco.com uses both its physical grocery stores and a newly-
opened stand-alone warehouse for order fulfillment. The new warehouse was opened in 
February, 2007 in Croydon in South London to serve the area where fewer Tesco stores 
are present or where online grocery demand is exceptionally high. 
Tesco.com’s order picking process is assisted by wireless smart Atigo tablet 
computers developed by Xperience. 
4.3.1.3 Safeway. Safeway.com uses Safeway-owned stores to fulfill orders. The 
company uses an analytics reporting system developed with Fireclick to control 
inventory and track performance. A tablet computer called “Teampad” that shows orders 
is attached to a picker’s cart to aid the picking process. Safeway employees assemble 
orders from store shelves with the help of the tablet computer. 
4.3.1.4 FreshDirect. FreshDirect has a 300,000-square-foot warehouse 
designed to handle 1000 orders per hour or 10,000 orders per day in Long Island City. 
This is a highly-automated facility with multiple temperature zones for the freshness of 
various food items. SAP AG software and miles of conveyor belts move bins of ordered 
items to the final sorting area after passing through different departments. It follows 
USDA guidelines and the HACCP food safety system to ensure the quality of its goods. 
FreshDirect’s batch manufacturing system is similar to that of Dell’s. Its supply 
chain and fulfillment technology make it possible to deliver highly personalized orders. 




In 2006, FreshDirect even utilized Automation Associates, Inc.’s (AAI) simulation 
modeling software and services to build and further improve operations efficiency within 
its warehouse (“Online Grocer, Fresh,” 2006).  
4.3.1.5 Webvan. Webvan built a centralized warehouse and distribution center in 
every market it entered. Webvan placed a $1 billion order with the engineering company 
Bechtel to build its state-of-the-art warehouses at $35 million each. In the warehouses, 
processes are controlled by a customized warehouse management system based on 
the commercial product from OPT. The money spent on infrastructure was enormous.  
Webvan bought a fleet of delivery trucks, 30 Sun Microsystems Enterprise 4500 
servers, dozens of Compaq ProLiant computers, several Cisco Systems 7513 and 7507 
routers and other high-tech equipment. 
4.3.1.6 Streamline. Streamline leased a 56,000-square-foot warehouse in 
Westwood, Massachusetts, for its initial operation in the Boston area. This warehouse 
cost the company $364,000 a month. It also leased another 56,000-square-foot 
warehouse in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Streamline acquired assets of Shopping 
Alternatives, Inc. in the Washington, DC, area and Beacon Home Direct, Inc. in the 
Chicago area. In October, 1999, the company signed a lease for a 102,000- square-foot 
distribution facility in Carlstadt, New Jersey. In April, 2000, Streamline announced the 
signing of a lease for a 108,000-square-foot facility in Shakopee, Minnesota, to facilitate 
entry into the Minneapolis market. In addition, the company also signed a lease for a 
147,000-square-foot building in Norwood, Massachusetts.  
Streamline’s warehouses were called consumer resource centers. They were 
located in industrial settings and  allowed the company to create efficient operational 
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processes. For example, inventory was stocked according to movement and 
temperature requirements rather than customer aesthetics, which allowed Streamline to 
maximize pick-and-pack efficiency. 
4.3.2 Order-picking Method 
4.3.2.1 Peapod. In the early years, Peapod partnered with various supermarkets. 
Personal shoppers employed by Peapod picked orders directly from their shelves. For 
example, in Chicago, Peapod picked from Jewel stores, and in San Francisco, Peapod 
partnered with Safeway.  Later, Peapod co-branded with these chains with names like 
“Peapod by Stop-and-Shop” and “Peapod by Giant.”  In 1997, Peapod began using 
warerooms attached to the stores, so they could pick orders without obstructing 
customers who were physically at the store.  After their business in Chicago and 
Washington, DC, grew, Peapod then started using central warehouses from which they 
could put together orders for these markets. 
4.3.2.2 Tesco. Tesco originally had pickers pick online orders directly from 
shelves of neighborhood Tesco stores. Each transaction made on the website is logged 
on Tesco’s central server. Order information is relayed to the shop nearest to the 
postcode specified on the order’s delivery address. Currently there are 294 Tesco 
stores in the UK that also fulfill online grocery orders.  
The pickers are equipped with a cart-mounted tablet PC. The orders that are 
downloaded to a shop’s local server are then split into logical picking groups. The cart-
mount system coordinates the shopping lists and guides personal shoppers through the 
store. A bar code reader is attached to the tablet PC to allow pickers to scan picked 
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items into the system. Customer-specified substitution preferences are also displayed 
for the pickers to make adequate alternative choices for online grocery shoppers. 
Tesco opened its first warehouse in 2007. This online-only facility serves the 
online customers to the south of London. The products in the warehouse are laid out the 
same way as in a standard Tesco store. The shelves are also filled the same way as in 
a physical store. Therefore, the pickers pick orders in the same way. Tesco has now 
over 9,000 staff picking online grocery orders in its UK stores (Tesco Annual Review, 
2008). 
4.3.2.3 Safeway. According to an interview with Safeway employee Ryan Lynch 
at a Safeway fulfillment store on April 19, 2008, Safeway.com has employees pick 
orders in stores. Once Safeway receives online orders, order information is transmitted 
to the customers’ nearby stores, where pickers would hand-select products from the 
shelves and put together several orders at a time.  
The professional pickers are equipped with an electronic device (a tablet PC 
named Teampad) attached to their carts and can read order details from it. The device 
also shows the pickers exactly where the items are and the fastest route to collect the 
items. When the picker picks up the product, he scans it directly into the Teampad then 
puts it into the basket. The picker would select all produce items for all orders (up to 6 at 
a time) before selecting all the meat items, rather than shopping the whole store for one 
customer at a time. 
4.3.2.4 FreshDirect. In FreshDirect’s centralized warehouse, temperatures are 
carefully controlled to keep food fresh. SAP AG software is used to process orders. 
Orders placed on its website are sent out to FreshDirect’s employees, many wear wool 
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gloves and hats under their plastic protective gear, in different departments. All order 
components are prepared, packaged, weighed, and priced, then placed inside bins that 
travel along miles of conveyors to the sorting area. Items of each order are gathered 
together, scanned, and put into delivery boxes.  
4.3.2.5 Webvan. The Webvan warehouses had three zones determined by 
temperature: ambient, chilled, and frozen. Yellow totes were used for picking ambient 
products, while green ones were for chilled products and blue ones for frozen products. 
Heavier ambient products were picked from flow racks. Other goods were placed on 
rotating carousels. Instead of having pickers move around in the warehouses to 
assemble orders, Webvan had goods moving to pickers. Different pickers were involved 
in filling each order (“We’re Building,” 1999).  
Webvan pickers for ambient products had a wrist-mounted display and finger-
mounted scanner. Pickers who worked by the carousels used a terminal to identify 
which locations to pull from and in which tote to place the picked items. Completed 
orders moved on carousels to the check/ship zone. 
4.3.2.6 Streamline. Streamline picked orders in its consumer resource centers. 
These centers were warehouses that had an industrial setting. Products were separated 
into a number of different areas based on product characteristics such as perishability, 
fragility, temperature zone, odor and purchase frequency to maintain quality and 
improve picking efficiency. Order picking took place overnight after 11:00 p.m. on the 
day before the scheduled delivery. 
Streamline optimized the picking process by employing traditional logistical 
techniques such as segregating fast and slow-moving items. To maximize efficiency, 
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Streamline employees picked multiple customer orders at one time, aided by a hand-
held computerized device that directs them to pick orders in the most efficient pattern 
while maintaining accuracy through bar coding. Once the order was picked and 
consolidated in each customer's delivery bins, employees staged it for delivery in the 
morning. 
4.3.3. Inventory Control 
4.3.3.1 Peapod. Peapod carries a large selection of perishable and non-
perishable items that you would find in traditional grocery stores as well as chef-
prepared meals. Product prices are comparable to those in local supermarkets. 
When Peapod competed with customers at the physical stores when fulfilling 
orders, it was difficult to keep track of the inventory. During an interview, Thomas 
Parkinson, C.F.O. of Peapod, said this caused their out-of-stock level to be 10%, which 
meant Peapod had to employ in-store facilities separated from customers (Cox, 2007). 
 4.3.3.2 Tesco. Tesco.com carries the same inventory as the local Tesco 
stores.Tesco.com fulfills its online grocery orders from physical stores. Robert Rubin, a 
Forrester Research analyst, said that store-pick models suffer from inventory tracking 
problems, because an in-store customer may have picked up the last item of something 
that was just ordered online (Sandoval, 2002). High substitution rate is a frequently-
heard complaint from customers. 
4.3.3.3 Safeway. Safeway.com offers the same selections and price as local 
Safeway and Vons grocery stores. Safeway.com uses Safeway-owned stores to fulfill 
orders. One store in each region is designated as the fulfillment store; therefore 
Safeway needs data about the selection and inventory of this particular store. Because 
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Safeway could not find a pre-existing system to meet its analytical needs (“How Web 
Analytics,” 2004), the company worked with Digital River’s Fireclick to develop a new 
one. After six months of group effort between Safeway.com and Fireclick, the result was 
a sales and inventory reporting system that Safeway used to track products and analyze 
performance.   
4.3.3.4 FreshDirect. FreshDirect offers 5000 perishable products but only 3000 
choices in packaged goods (versus 2200 perishables and 25,000 packaged goods in a 
typical grocery store). The margins for perishable goods are higher than non-perishable 
goods, thus FreshDirect gets 8% higher gross margins (“What an E-tailer,” 2003). 
FreshDirect’s selections include many organic products, locally-grown items and Kosher 
foods, as well as items that are seen in supermarkets daily. Its four-minute-meals, 
ready-to-cook, and heat-and-eat meals are also popular among customers. 
FreshDirect is based in a 300,000-square-foot building in Long Island City, 
Queens. Inventory control is relatively easy due to the use of the company’s highly-
automated, state-of-the-art facility that is not involved in retail operations and its 
sophisticated software. A batch manufacturing process helps it keep waste to a 
minimum. No substitutions are made because of accurate inventory information. 
4.3.3.5 Webvan. Webvan carried approximately 20,000 stock-keeping units 
(SKUs) in its warehouse. It also had a consumer electronics and entertainment category 
featuring personal consumer electronics, video games, movies, and CDs. It also sold 
books, mass-transit fare and toll cards.  
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Webvan built numerous highly-automated warehouses to fulfill orders. In each 
market, a large inventory was kept in one central warehouse. Software kept track of 
what was moving.  
4.3.3.6 Streamline. Streamline was neither the most expensive nor the least 
expensive retail/service provider. The price of products was similar to that of a 
traditional supermarket. The food, approximately 11,000 SKUs, was supplied to 
Streamline by SuperValu. Streamline also offered other services such as dry cleaning 
pick-up and delivery, package pick-up and delivery, and video and video game rental. 
The other services the company provided were handled through local operators under 
contract. 
In Streamline’s warehouses (consumer resource centers), inventory was stocked 
according to movement and temperature requirements rather than customer aesthetics 
which allowed the company to maximize pick-and-pack efficiency. Streamline also used 
customer purchasing data to maximize the efficiency of internal operations. By 
understanding the ordering patterns of the company’s customers, Streamline was better 
able to capture and forecast real demand for products and services, which enabled the 
company to maintain lower inventory levels and decrease inventory carrying costs. 
4.3.4 Summary 
 There are two major models when it comes to order fulfillment: one is assembling 
orders from store shelves, the other from central warehouses. Of the six e-grocers 
examined, Safeway assembles online orders from the shelves of stores; Peapod and 
Tesco use a combination of store fulfillment and warehouse fulfillment; and FreshDirect, 
Webvan and Streamline use warehouses to fulfill orders. 
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4.4 Order Delivery Strategies 
This section describes delivery options, pricing and the strategies each e-grocer 
employs to improve operational efficiency. 
4.4.1 Order Delivery Options and Pricing 
4.4.1.1 Peapod. Peapod offers both attended and unattended delivery to 
residential customers seven days a week. The time of delivery can be as early as the 
next day or as late as two weeks later. No one has to be at home when the delivery is 
made.  For unattended delivery, the order will be left in insulated containers to preserve 
the temperature, at a place designated by the customer.  Peapod also provides 
deliveries to businesses on weekdays.  Peapod delivery fee is from $6.95 to $17.95 
depending on the order amount, location and whether it is for residential or business 
delivery (see Appendix G for Peapod delivery fees). Tips are accepted by drivers. 
4.4.1.2 Tesco. Tesco.com delivers groceries 7 days a week to most of the 
residential addresses in the UK Deliveries can be scheduled as early as the next day or 
as late as 3 weeks later.  Delivery fees vary between £3.75 (approximately $6.50) and 
£6.25 (approximately $10.80) depending on the time-slots chosen. Deliveries are made 
from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. All delivery windows are for periods of two hours. Tips are 
not accepted by drivers. 
4.4.1.3 Safeway. Safeway offers only attended delivery to residential and 
business customers. Groceries are delivered in refrigerated trucks designed to maintain 
temperature integrity for fresh and frozen products. Someone over 18 years of age must 
be present to accept orders. Drivers bring the order to the customers’ kitchens.  
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Delivery can be scheduled for as early as next day or as late as three weeks later. 
Both four-hour windows and two hour-windows are available. The regular delivery 
charge is $7.95-$12.95. Delivery fees vary slightly depending on location, the length of 
the delivery window and the order amount. The minimum order amount is $50.00. No 
tips are accepted by drivers. 
4.4.1.4 FreshDirect. FreshDirect offers attended deliveries seven days a week to 
residential addresses and five days a week to corporate offices. Orders can be 
scheduled to be delivered as soon as the next day or as late as seven days later. Most 
delivery windows are for periods of two hours. 
Minimum order size for home delivery is $30.00. Delivery fees vary from $4.99 to 
$6.99 depending on customers’ locations and order sizes.  The minimum order size for 
a corporate delivery is $75.00. The delivery cost is $14.99.  
FreshDirect also offers a special Corporate Depot Program which is available to 
corporations in the Tri-State area with 1000+ employees. FreshDirect works with 
interested companies and brings its trucks to a designated spot in the parking lot for the 
employees to pick up their orders. Customers can also pick up their online orders at 
FreshDirect’s Long Island facility. There is no charge for pickup. Tips are accepted by 
drivers. 
4.4.1.5 Webvan. Webvan adopted a hub-and-spoke system. Several transfer 
stations were set up around each warehouse to distribute orders to local customers. 
Webvan allowed customers to schedule delivery within a 30-minute time window. 
Orders had to be received by 8:00 p.m. the day before delivery. Webvan charged 
customers $4.95 for orders of $75 or less and offered free delivery for orders of $75 or 
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more. Later, delivery fees were raised to $9.95 for orders less than $75, $4.95 for 
orders of $75 to $100 and free for orders of $100 or more (“Webvan Adopts,” 2001). 
Tips were accepted by drivers. 
 4.4.1.6 Streamline. Streamline delivered products and services to each customer 
through a single weekly delivery. Streamline customers did not need to be home to 
receive their orders. Streamline offered two options for unattended delivery. In the first 
(and least expensive) option, Streamline used a chill container that kept refrigerated and 
even frozen products fresh up to 30 hours. Streamline’s drivers retrieved the container 
left on the previous trip when they made the next delivery. The second and more 
expensive option was limited to consumers with a garage. Streamline installed a keypad 
outside the garage which gave the delivery person a way to gain entry. A 60”x30”x62” 
box was installed in the consumer’s garage and included a refrigerated section, a frozen 
section, and a section for dry goods. These unattended deliveries were made before 
6:00 p.m. on a fixed weekday each week. Streamline charged a $39 reception box 
setup fee and a $30 monthly subscription charge for one delivery per week. Tips were 
not accepted by drivers. 
4.4.2 Strategies for Operational Efficiency  
4.4.2.1 Peapod. On Wednesdays and weekends, deliveries are only offered 
between 7 a.m. and 1 p.m., while the delivery times on the other days occur between 
2:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. Peapod has different delivery times available at different prices. 
Once a residential customer is on the “Delivery Times” web page, the Peapod website 
will show all the delivery slots, with some marked as “save $1.00” and some marked as 
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“$1.00 additional charge.” Longer delivery windows are available for a reduced charge, 
while the most popular delivery windows are charged an additional fee.  
Peapod introduced “SmartMile,” which encourages customers to choose a 
delivery time when Peapod will be in their neighborhood. These “SmartMile” delivery 
windows are offered at a discount to attract customers. Peapod also has different web 
pages stating different discounts and selections for different markets. For example, for 
Greenwich, Connecticut, Wednesdays are called “value days;” therefore, all delivery 
slots are discounted from $1.00 to $2.50 on Wednesdays. 
Peapod understands the amount of anxiety and inconvenience a long delivery 
window can cause. For the regularly-priced delivery slots and reduced fee (longer) slots, 
an Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) is available for customers to track the possible time 
the delivery truck will arrive within a two-hour window. Customers can access ETA 
information through their mobile phone or by logging into their accounts.  
4.4.2.2 Tesco. Delivery time slots are priced differently according to their 
popularity to encourage the use of less-popular delivery windows. Orders are spread 
out across the week and throughout the day to ensure high efficiency of delivery. 
Customers of Tesco.com have the choice of getting a “bagless” delivery. Those 
who select this option will have their groceries delivered in stackable green trays directly 
to their kitchens. These customers are offered Green Clubcard points, and Tesco.com 
is able to reduce the number of bags it uses. 
4.4.2.3 Safeway. Safeway.com encourages customers to choose longer delivery 
windows by offering lower delivery charges. On the page showing delivery windows, a 
customer can click, “How can I lower my delivery charge?”.The system shows that a 
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customer will get $3.00 off a delivery charge by ordering more than $150.00 or choosing 
a four-hour delivery window. (Note that this $3.00 saving is already counted into the 
delivery fee of any four-hour delivery window displayed.)  
4.4.2.4 FreshDirect. FreshDirect delivers from early in the morning until late in 
the night to try to avoid the busy New York City (N.Y.C.) traffic. Being flexible is key in 
N.Y.C. To serve the high-demand market, FreshDirect puts more delivery employees in 
each truck and has additional delivery personnel waiting at predetermined locations to 
take orders off the trucks and deliver them on foot. 
4.4.2.5 Webvan. Delivery charges varied depending on the order amount. The 
utilization rate of drivers was low. For example, in its Atlanta market, there were about 
20 delivery vans. Drivers only managed to make 17 delivers in an eight-hour shift. This 
rate of just two deliveries each hour was extremely low and not cost effective (Bartholdi, 
III, 2006). According to Forrester analyst Robert Rubin, Webvan’s delivery cost was 
$150-$160 per hour. Yet it only made an average of 1.8 deliveries per hour. Webvan’s 
average order amount was $91.33. The money it made barely covered the delivery cost, 
not the cost of the food itself (Slaton, 2001). 
4.4.2.6 Streamline. Since Streamline used unattended delivery, orders did not 
have to be delivered to customers’ residents in a scheduled short time frame. The 
unattended delivery system, through which Streamline delivered orders to customers at 
a fixed delivery day each week, allowed the company to maximize fleet utilization and 
create routing efficiencies. Streamline delivered about ten orders per hour compared to 
about three for an e-grocer that used attended delivery. Streamline also implemented 




 All e-grocers examined offer home delivery of groceries. FreshDirect also offers 
free pickup. Attended delivery is the delivery method used by most e-grocers, but 
Streamline only offered unattended delivery. Various routing methods and other ways of 
encouraging the use of less-popular delivery-time slots are utilized to improve e-grocers’ 
operational efficiency. 
4.5 Web Design and Customer Relations Management   
This section examines each e-grocer’s web design and strategies for customer 
acquisition and retention. 
4.5.1 Peapod  
 Peapod’s website is well designed and easy to navigate. Multiple search 
methods are provided to help find an item. Shopping lists can be created and kept 
online. Order history is easily found for making repeat purchases. For people who are 
new to its website, registration is not necessary to view items. The website is colorful 
and a joy to look at.  
As of November, 2006, Peapod had delivered to 270,000 customers. As noted by 
Peapod’s spokesperson Paula Wheeler, Peapod started small and marketed 
aggressively to build its business (Sandoval, 2002). In 1995, Peapod launched its first 
advertising campaign and gained 4,600 members. After that the customer base was 
built mostly through word of mouth. Peapod has Volkswagen Beetles painted brightly 




Peapod.com launched an Affiliate Program to generate more traffic to its website. 
Any website can join this program and refer new customers to Peapod and earn money. 
On a monthly basis, commissions are offered to the website according to the number of 
customers the site referred. For individual customers who refer a friend, Peapod gives 
both the customer and the friend a $10 rebate. Peapod accepts manufacturers’ and 
internet coupons. It does not accept competitors’ coupons. Customers give coupons to 
delivery drivers to get the coupons’ value refunded to their account. 
Peapod offers product selection that is the same as the local Ahold grocery 
stores that help fulfill the orders. Peapod’s prices are comparable to traditional grocery 
store prices. Peapod guarantees the online price for seven calendar days starting from 
the day the order is placed. If the order is scheduled for delivery in more than seven 
days, the price will be adjusted to reflect the current price.  
4.5.2. Tesco 
 Tesco.com’s website requires registration to view the contents. Multiple methods 
like “Express Shopper” and “My favorites” are provided for item searching. The page 
design is quite simple and straightforward.  
Tesco has its loyalty card program. Tesco.com customers can collect Clubcard 
points just like shoppers at physical Tesco stores. On Tesco.com, customers can use 
“Tesco Price Check” to compare the price of everything they carry to those carried by 
Tesco’s major competitors. Competitors’ coupons are accepted by delivery drivers. 
Customers get credit back on their payment cards. Tesco introduced a fleet of fully 
electric, zero-emission home delivery vans in May, 2007 to improve the company image 
and gain the business of environmentally conscious consumers. 
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Tesco.com’s price and selection are as same as local Tesco stores. There is one 
drawback: Tesco.com customers are charged the price in the store on the day the 
orders are picked and delivered. So the savings they saw while ordering their groceries 
online may no longer be valid on the day of delivery. This policy risks alienating price-
conscious customers.  
4.5.3 Safeway 
Registration is not necessary for someone who wants to view the items 
Safeway.com offers. Safway’s website is designed for customers to easily find what 
they want. Clubcard specials and online specials are clearly displayed. Items can be 
sorted according to price, brand or clubcard specials. The design is simple and 
straightforward. 
Safeway.com campaigned hard to attract consumers to use its online grocery 
service. In 2003, Safeway launched a multi-media advertising campaign in the San 
Francisco area, including TV, radio, direct-mail, and e-mail promotions. According to 
GroceryWorks’ (operator of Safeway.com) CEO Mitchell Rhodes in 2003, these 
campaigns were to let more consumers know about Safeway.com and convince them of 
the convenience of online grocery shopping (Demery, 2003). 
By linking Safeway.com accounts with customers’ Safeway club cards accounts, 
Safeway.com shows customers the items that they’ve purchased online as well as in 
stores. Online customers share the same club card discounts and full range of products 
available at their neighborhood Safeway stores. The airline mileage credits from the 
United Mileage Plus program are also available to online shoppers. Safeway.com also 
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has an affiliate program that offers money to the websites that refer customers to 
Safeway.com. 
Safeway.com’s price and selection match those of the designated fulfillment 
stores in each area. 
4.5.4 FreshDirect 
FreshDirect’s website is full of beautiful pictures of food items and produce. It is 
designed to capture the eyes and appetites of customers. Anyone can browse the aisles 
to see what’s being prepared for your table. FreshDirect takes pride in the way the food 
is handled in its facility. Detailed information can be found on its website regarding the 
food preparation process.  
Delivery fees are kept low. The newly lowered minimum order amount is only 
$30.00. FreshDirect items are offered at prices 10-35% less than local supermarkets. 
Ready-made meal items and quick-heat meals are big sellers. A customized order 
differentiates it from other grocers. FreshDirect guarantees 100% customer satisfaction, 
but product selection is smaller. 
4.5.5 Webvan 
According to Schubert and Leimstoll (2001, p5), Webvan’s website “embodies an 
ambitious Web solution with good communication towards the customer. The product 
supply is extremely large and manifold and you find a lot of additional information about 
the products. Webvan distinguishes itself with a fast registration and with user-friendly 
features in the agreement phase.” 
Webvan partnered with Old Navy, Coca-Cola, Kraft Foods, and other firms to 
market its service. The company spent an estimated 30% of sales revenue on 
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marketing to build brand recognition (Levine, 2002). Webvan had a “tell a friend” referral 
program that rewarded customers for introducing Webvan to their friends and family. 
Webvan’s website had anexpanded customer feedback feature that allowed 
customers to make product suggestions. Webvan.com received the number one ranking 
out of 12 online grocers evaluated by Gomez (a leading provider of Internet research 
and analysis). The Gomez Summer 2000 Internet Grocery Services Scorecard ranked 
webvan.com high in areas such as Customer Confidence, Relationship Services and 
Overall Cost (“Webvan.com Heats Up,” 2000). Webvan’s prices were comparable to the 
price of traditional supermarkets. Its selection was bigger, because Webvan also carried 
items like consumer electronics. 
4.5.6 Streamline 
Streamline had a customer referral program. It also marketed its services by 
forming relationships with strategic partners and engaging in joint marketing. Streamline 
worked with Nordstrom to utilize Nordstrom’s brand loyalty, existing customer 
relationships and presence in similar target markets. By continuing to introduce new 
products and service offerings, Streamline sought to increase the size of customers’ 
weekly orders. The company’s technology/ software allowed it to track customer 
purchasing data to determine what products and services busy suburban families are 
most likely to appreciate. Streamline’s strategy was to build a single consolidated 
operation that satisfied customers’ multiple needs and become the primary supplier of 
many products and services customers acquire. 
 Streamline offered over 10,000 SKUs of food items and a wide array of services. 




The examined e-grocers designed their websites around the ease of navigation 
and the richness of contents. Multiple tools are offered to help customers find a product 
easily. Nutrition information and recipes are provided. Streamline offered special 
services such as dry cleaning and shoe repair. Other e-grocers use varied strategies to 
create customer intimacy, capture information on customer’s preferences and make the 
shopping experience a delightful one.   
4.6 Cross-case Analysis and Findings 
This section makes comparisons of the operational characteristics and strategies 
of Peapod, Tesco, Safeway, FreshDirect, Webvan and Streamline. The goal is to look 
for common patterns that distinguish successful and unsuccessful e-grocers.  
4.6.1 Analysis 
The matrix/table in Appendix H shows a comparison of the six e-grocers 
according to the data collected. Of those six e-grocers, Peapod, Tesco, Safeway, and 
FreshDirect are the ones whose online grocery businesses are still going strong in 
today’s market. Considerations include: 
What patterns were found in the survivors’ strategi es? 
1. Management teams have sufficient experience and knowledge of the traditional 
grocery business.  
Tesco.com and Safeway.com are both run by traditional grocers. Of the two 
founders of FreshDirect, one once co-founded a traditional supermarket; and the 
other was a former investment banker specializing in the grocery business. 
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Peapod’s founders, the Parkinson brothers, hadn’t worked in the grocery industry, 
but were later joined by a new CEO from Royal Ahold. 
2. Although Peapod, Tesco, Safeway, and FreshDirect operate in markets of 
differing customer densities, Peapod, Tesco, and Safeway use store-pick model 
in most markets. However, both Peapod and Tesco moved to warehouse-pick 
model in markets where they saw greater demand. FreshDirect focuses its 
business in the N.Y.C metro area where population density and demand for e-
groceries is especially high. FreshDirect also uses the warehouse-pick model.   
3. All offer an attended grocery delivery service with similar charges. Some also 
offer unattended delivery or pickup services. 
4. Peapod, Tesco.com, Safeway.com took slow steps when it came to expansion. 
Their strategy was to expand services to areas with the brick-and-mortar support 
of their parent companies when choosing to enter a new market. Capital 
expenses for starting a new market were kept low as a result. Utilizing a 
warehouse-pick model, FreshDirect still focuses on expanding its business in 
New York City, which has a very high level of customer density. 
These patterns of strategies were compared to Webva n and Streamline, 
two unsuccessful e-grocers, in order to investigate  any differences. 
1. None of Webvan's major investors or senior executives, including its C.E.O. 
George Shaheen (former head of Andersen Consulting), had any 
management experience in the supermarket industry. Webvan’s founder 
Louis Borders once compared his company to Amazon.com, Yahoo!, eBay 
and CNN in an interview (“We’re Building,” 1999)—not even one was a 
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supermarket chain Webvan was competing with. Streamline was founded by 
a former stockbroker, Timothy A. DeMello. He remained as Streamline’s 
Chairman and C.E.O. until the day Streamline filed for bankruptcy. It wasn’t 
until the final years before Streamline closed that the company started to 
bring in executives who had more experience in the grocery industry and 
store rollout.  
2. Webvan and Streamline expanded their business quickly across the country. No 
matter how many potential customers existed in each market, Webvan used its 
central-warehouse-picking model everywhere and built its own costly 
infrastructure in every market. Streamline leased expensive warehouses and 
used the capital it raised from the stock market on its aggressive national rollout 
plan until it ran out of money to keep operating. The relatively successful e-
grocers use the low-startup-cost store-pick model in most markets and a much 
more cautious and slow growth strategy. Note that FreshDirect utilizes a 
warehouse-pick model and succeeds in New York City where there is high 
demand for e-groceries. Peapod later began to use centralized warehouses in 
Chicago and Washington, DC, where customer demand had been high. Tesco 
also started using one warehouse in 2007 in a high-demand market. This 
interesting fact suggests that the warehouse-pick model may be the way to go 
when customer density is already high enough to offset the higher fixed cost.  
How are the survivors/winners different from each o ther? 
1. Selection/pricing of products varies.  
The selection and product price and quality of Peapod, Tesco.com, and 
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Safeway.com are comparable to those of the brick-and-mortar stores they pick 
their orders from. A delivery fee is charged to cover the costs of order assembly 
and delivery. FreshDirect takes a different approach. It offers less selection than 
a traditional supermarket but lower prices, higher quality, and more customized 
products are provided. FreshDirect stocks more (higher-margin) perishable items 
than non-perishable items. Due to the high level of customer density in New York 
City, FreshDirect’s delivery fee and minimum order amount are also lower than 
the other e-grocers. Grocery pick-up is free. Its competitive strategy is apparently 
different from the other three. 
2. The customers they serve are not the same. 
Peapod and FreshDirect serve both residential and corporate customers. Tesco 
and Safeway only serve residential customers. 
4.6.2 Findings 
Through the examination and comparisons of the six e-grocers and the analysis 
of the similarities and differences of their business strategies, the following patterns 
were identified: 
Finding #1: The management team’s knowledge and exp erience in the 
supermarket industry is an important factor in deci ding an e-grocer’s success or 
failure.  
To take full advantage of the opportunities provided in e-commerce, grocers 
need to utilize whatever know-how and resources they can get and use them wisely. 
Webvan and Streamline’s lack of experience in the grocery business led them to over-
investment in a low-margin industry. To some extent, having knowledge of the 
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supermarket industry not only means having the capability to make the right decisions, it 
also means having the vital connections and resources at hand. For example, grocery 
business veterans like Safeway and Tesco already have a mature grocery supply chain. 
With the tremendous purchasing power of their existing stores, they can get the best 
prices possible from suppliers (economies of scale). Better knowledge of supply chains 
enables operational efficiency and better margins. Margins are razor-thin in food 
retailing and thus don’t allow new businesses much room for learning or error.   
In the internet boom years, Webvan and Streamline had huge amounts of 
venture capital, yet the lack of experience in the supermarket business cost the two 
companies dearly. Webvan and Streamline were paying their dues dealing with their 
own supply chain and building/leasing expensive warehouses. Their management 
teams made a huge mistake taking the high-cost route in the low-profit-margin grocery 
industry.  
Finding #2: Using a cautious and slow expansion str ategy helps e-grocers 
control expenses and stay in the game. 
Peapod, Tesco, and Safeway gradually expand their e-grocery business to 
markets where their parent companies have a strong presence of existing brick-and-
mortar grocery stores. FreshDirect slowly adds more zip codes to its delivery zones. 
Compared to Webvan and Streamline’s aggressive and quick national rollout plan, the 
more cautious growth strategy of Peapod, Tesco, Safeway, and FreshDirect helps them 
avoid high start-up costs and overinvestment in low-demand markets. As a result, the 
proper growth strategy increases their ability to survive and thrive in the e-grocery 
industry. It also helps them to grow the business, because profits can be plowed back 
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into growing the business rather than servicing debt.  They use an organic, sustainable 
growth strategy.  
Finding #3: Using the brick-and-mortar-supported st ore-pick model, which 
requires a lower start-up cost in most markets, hel ps an e-grocer survive in 
today’s market. The pure-play warehouse-pick model can be used in high- 
customer-density markets. 
The e-grocery business in the US has its own unique situation. In the UK, the 
population density is much higher than in the US, and grocery stores are crowded. 
Many people do not have cars to take heavy grocery items home. Shoppers are eager 
and ready to transition from the traditional way of grocery shopping to shopping online. 
As the first proven successful e-grocer, Tesco took advantage of a dense market and 
saved money by using the infrastructure of its existing brick-and-mortar stores.  
The UK’s high customer density is not what the US e-grocers have right now. 
America is a country that has more land and a lower population density than the UK. 
The grocery stores here normally offer quite pleasant shopping experiences. Many 
American families have at least one car per adult. Although people complain about the 
long lines in local grocery stores all the time, it does not mean they will quit standing in 
them. Only a low percentage of people are motivated to shop for groceries online. This 
suggests that online food shopping might never represent more than a small niche in 
the US grocery market. Furthermore, the conditions in each market vary greatly. Large 
cities like New York City and Washington, D.C. are more like the UK. Higher customer 
density offers e-grocers better opportunities to achieve the necessary volume to 
become profitable. The population’s propensity to rely on public transportation would 
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also be a factor—not all cities with population density have efficient, well-used public 
transportation systems. Cities that do have systems would be better markets for e-
grocers, because it’s no fun to drag groceries on a bus or subway.  E-grocers are still 
struggling to survive in other parts of the US that have less customer density. Therefore, 
the store-pick model, which requires much less up-front infrastructure investment, is 
becoming the norm in today’s US online grocery business.  
The brick-and-mortar/store-pick model entails lower fixed costs. The employees 
of brick-and-mortar stores become pickers assembling online orders. Traditional 
supermarket chains like Safeway and Tesco use this model to offer multiple shopping 
channels to their existing customers and attract new customers. Brick-and-mortar 
support lets e-grocers be flexible and take their time to wait for customer adoption rate 
to rise. The warehouse-pick model is gradually being moved into markets that already 
have customer density high enough to achieve higher operating efficiency and better 
inventory control. Webvan’s failure was largely due to its lack of brick-and-mortar 
support in low-customer-density markets. The high cost of operating warehouses in 
these markets hindered its opportunity to become profitable. 
Finding #4: There are variations of competitive str ategies the successful e-
grocers use within their business models.  
For example, efficient supply chain management and delivery services are 
achieved in different ways. Peapod, Tesco, and Safeway use the existing supermarket 
chains’ tremendous buying power and infrastructure to reduce cost. FreshDirect 
eliminates middlemen by buying directly from growers to get cheap and high-quality 
produce. These e-grocers use different strategies to cut costs out of supply chains: 
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Brick-and-mortar e-grocers already have the efficient supply chain via physical stores, 
while FreshDirect buys direct.  
All successful e-grocers examined in this research offer at least attended delivery 
to customers. Some also offer unattended deliveries or pick-up service. Different 
strategies are utilized to deliver e-grocery orders to customers in a cost-effective way. 
For attended deliveries, a certain delivery window must be met. Peapod offers 
unattended delivery, which has less time restrictions and helps improve the efficiency of 
delivery drivers. For pick-up of online orders, FreshDirect does not charge a fee. This 
method is used to increase the sales volume. 
Peapod and FreshDirect deliver to both residential and corporate customers, 
while Tesco and Safeway only deliver to residential customers. By targeting a broader 
range of customers, Peapod and FreshDirect seek to generate higher demand.  
In summary, there are strategic variations within each e-grocery model. These 







This chapter sums up the e-grocery industry research. The contributions and 
limitations of this research are also covered. Finally, possible directions for future 
research are given. 
5.1 Looking Back 
This thesis conducted case studies of six e-grocers (Peapod, Tesco, Safeway, 
FreshDirect, Webvan, and Streamline), in an effort to determine which operating 
characteristics should be best applied. Five major research questions concerning 
management, expansion strategy, target market, logistics, fulfillment, and customer 
relations were used to guide the investigation.  Each major question has more specific 
questions associated with it to ensure the data collection is thorough and relevant. A 
meta-analysis of the case studies indicated that in most markets where customer 
density is not especially high, successful e-grocers generally distributed from brick-and-
mortar stores. More centralized warehouses tended to be found where customer 
demand has grown enough to support it in the area that the e-grocer covers. Evidence 
was also found to suggest that being careful and cautious while expanding helps e-
grocers stay focused on making profits in existing markets and avoid the mistake of 
irrational overinvestment. An e-grocer’s management team should have knowledge and 
experience in the grocery business to make the right decisions.  
In today’s online grocery industry, there are two predominant business models. 
One is the brick-and-mortar model which utilizes the already available resources of 
traditional supermarkets. The other is the pure-play model which only supports ordering 
online and operates facilities separate from any brick-and-mortar stores. There are also 
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certain e-grocery firms that use a combination of these two major models to strike a 
balance between markets of varied customer-demand levels. Variations within each 
business model allow for strategic differentiation. Each e-grocer comes up with its own 
set of competitive strategies to tailor its services to different markets. 
The use of existing brick-and-mortar stores requires much less investment than 
the building of new warehouses.  It is this cost advantage that can make the difference 
between survival and failure, because the level of customer acceptance of buying 
groceries via the internet is still in its infancy in many locations.  In short, everything has 
to follow the basic rule of doing business. Businesses must find the right balance 
between the amount of investment they put into a market and the amount of customer 
demand that market offers–overinvestment puts the company at risk of bankruptcy. 
Johnson (2007) asked what businesses hoped to achieve by selling online–did 
they want to overhaul their business model or merely supplement their existing services?  
Of the six businesses covered in this study, Safeway and Tesco already had a large 
network of existing brick-and-mortar stores when they decided to go online.  They were 
not planning to turn their stores into warehouses–instead, they only wanted to add an 
extra distribution channel to serve their existing customers and for their businesses to 
reach more customers in the areas they served.  Royal Ahold bought Peapod and made 
Peapod its channel for selling groceries online. E-grocers like Safeway, Tesco and 
Peapod can afford to take it slow and use the less costly store-pick model until 
customer demand for online grocery shopping grows to a level that makes warehouse-
pick cost efficient. Even if their current online business model is not profitable, these e-
grocers can continue to operate. They can even expand their service to areas with low 
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customer demand to cultivate a broader customer base.  In contrast, Webvan, 
FreshDirect, and Streamline entered into the grocery business with different intentions. 
They came to lure customers away from traditional grocers by offering groceries online. 
Without brick-and-mortar support, pure-players like Webvan, FreshDirect, and 
Streamline had to have a cost-efficient business model from the very beginning in order 
to achieve profitability. A warehouse-pick model in markets that already have high 
customer demand is the way to go for these e-grocers. 
The online grocery business in the US is still in a recovery phase following the 
devastating failures of pioneers like Streamline.com, Homegrocer.com and Webvan. 
Grocery retailers realize that demand for e-grocery is limited. The e-grocery industry 
may or may not expand much beyond its present scope. Current e-grocers are still 
testing various business models in attempts to find avenues to success. Other 
researchers have looked into individual aspects of solutions for online grocery retailing. 
However, studies that provide systematic views of online grocery business models are 
rarely conducted.  This research has examined both successful and unsuccessful online 
grocers regarding what they have in common and what they do differently to shed light 
on strategies that can bring victory to today’s US e-grocers. A guaranteed recipe for 
success is not offered, but healthy starting points are suggested. 
5.2 Looking Forward 
E-grocers need enough customers to make the service financially worthwhile. 
Ways to increase customer demand for online grocery services could be an interesting 
area for future research. Customer characteristics and behavior can be studied 
intensively for this purpose.  
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Most e-grocers in the US offer items that are priced comparably to traditional 
grocery stores. A fee is often charged for delivery. The customers they target are those 
who look for an alternative way to shop for groceries. These convenience-sensitive 
customers are not the majority of customers; therefore, a niche market is often the best 
e-grocers can achieve. To attract price-sensitive shoppers, future research can focus on 
how e-grocers could offer prices that are lower than traditional grocery stores, and how 
e-grocers can achieve enough volume to make delivery charges as low as possible 
while still being able to make money.  
At the time of the writing of this thesis, Amazon started to test its new 
AmazonFresh online grocery service in the Seattle area. Home delivery is currently 
offered to a limited number of Seattle neighborhoods with limited coverage. 
AmazonFresh uses Amazon.com’s warehouses to fulfill orders. It recently changed its 
strategy and began to only offer service to Amazon Prime subscribers (AmazonFresh, 
n.d.). Amazon Prime is a program offered by Amazon.com where subscribers pay a $79 
annual fee to get free two-day shipping on eligible items from Amazon.com (Amazon 
Prime, n.d.). This obviously limits the number of customers who are willing to use 
AmazonFresh’s e-grocery service. Will AmazonFresh become another Webvan? What 
the future holds for AmazonFresh is still to be seen. Future research could look at 
AmazonFresh’s business model and its relative success. 
The road is still long for the online grocery business. There will be many ups and 
downs for the industry in the coming years.  As various business models are 
investigated, studied, and tried, e-grocers may yet find one that realizes Webvan’s 
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Table of Current US Online Grocers by State  (“Who Is Offering,” n.d.) 
Table 1 Current US Online Grocers 
 
State E-grocer Notes 
Alabama None  
Alaska King Soopers (Kroger) peach.kroger.com/sf/servlet/sto
refront 
Arizona Basha’s www.bashas.com 
Safeway www.safeway.com 
Arkansas None  
California Yummy.com This is the trade name that 
HomeGrocer.com now 





Colorado King Soopers (Kroger) peach.kroger.com/sf/servlet/sto
refront 
Aspen Grove Market  aspengrovemarket.gsngrocers.
com/splash_aspen.cfm 
Connecticut Peapod (Stop & Shop) www.peapod.com 
Fresh Direct www.freshdirect.com 
Geissler's www.geisslers.com 
Delaware Safeway In Delaware, Safeway uses 
Acme to fulfill their orders. 
www.safeway.com 
Harris Teeter www.harristeeter.com 
Florida Garden Grocer www.gardengrocer.com 
Beach Groceries www.beachgroceries.com 
Georgia None  
Hawaii None  
Idaho Albertsons www.albertsons.com 
Illinois Peapod www.peapod.com 
Potash Bros. www.potashbros.com 
Busch's www.buschs.com 
Indiana Grocery Stork www.grocery-stork.com 
Iowa Homegroceryexpress.com www.homegroceryexpress.com 
Kansas Homegroceryexpress.com www.homegroceryexpress.com 
Kentucky None  
Louisiana Robert Fresh Market  www.robertfreshmarket.com 
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State E-grocer Notes 
Maine None  
Maryland Safeway www.safeway.com 
Peapod (Giant) www.peapod.com 
Santoni’s www.santonismarket.com 
Massachusetts Roche Bros www.rochebros.com 
Peapod (Stop & Shop) www.peapod.com 
Lees Market  www.leesmarket.com 
Michigan Oleson’s Food Store www.olesonsfoods.com 
Minnesota Lunds / Byerly's www.lundsandbyerlys.com  
Simon Delivers www.simondelivers.com 
Corborn's www.coborns.com 
Mississippi None  
Missouri Homegroceryexpress.com www.homegroceryexpress.com  
Price Cutter www.pricecutteronline.com  
Montana None  
Nebraska Homegroceryexpress.com www.homegroceryexpress.com 
Nevada Albertsons www.albertsons.com 
Safeway  www.safeway.com 
New Hampshire None  




New Mexico None  
New York The Food Emporium www.thefoodemporiumshoponli
ne.com 
Waldbaums www.waldbaums.com 
Peapod (Stop & Shop) www.peapod.com 
Fresh Direct www.freshdirect.com 
D’Agnostino’s  www.dagnyc.com 
Citarella  www.citarella.com 
My Brands Inc. www.mybrandsinc.com 
YourGrocer.com  www.yourgrocer.com 
Gristedes www.gristedes.com 
North Carolina Harris Teeter  www.harristeeter.com 
Lowe’s Foods  www.lowesfoods.com 
North Dakota Hornbachers's www.hornbachers.com 
Ohio Dorothy Lane Market www.dorothylane.com 
Oklahoma None  
Oregon New Seasons Market www.newseasonsmarket.com  
Albertsons  www.albertsons.com 
Safeway  www.safeway.com 
Roth’s www.roths.com 
Pennsylvania Albertsons www.albertsons.com 
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State E-grocer Notes 
Safeway  www.safeway.com 
Rhode Island Peapod (Stop & Shop)  www.peapod.com 
South Carolina Harris Teeter  www.harristeeter.com 
Lowe’s Foods  www.lowesfoods.com 
South Dakota Homegroceryexpress.com www.homegroceryexpress.com 
Tennessee None  
Texas Rice Epicurean Markets  www.riceepicurean.com 
Family Center IGA www.familycenteriga.com 
Super S Foods www.supersfoods.com 
Utah Albertsons www.albertsons.com 
Vermont None  
Virginia Peapod (Giant) www.peapod.com 
Harris Teeter  www.harristeeter.com 
Lowe’s Foods  www.lowesfoods.com 
Washington Albertsons  www.albertsons.com 
Safeway  www.safeway.com 
Amazon Fresh  www.amazonfresh.com 
Washington, D.C. Safeway  www.safeway.com 
Peapod (Giant) www.peapod.com 
West Virginia None  
Wisconsin Peapod  www.peapod.com 
Sentry Foods www.sentryonthego.com 








Figure1. E-percent and adoption rates 
Note. From “Ten years after Webvan: A profitable expansion of the e-grocery business,” 








































Figure 2. A typical online grocery transaction 
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Appendix D  
 
Figure 3. Basic types of design for case studies 
Note. From Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed., pp. 40), by R. K. Yin, 
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Peapod Delivery Areas and Expansion Timeline 
Peapod delivers to (“Peapod LLC Corporate,” n.d.): 
• Boston, MA     • Long Island, NY 
• Cape Cod, MA    • Mt. Vernon, NY 
• Fairfax County, VA   • Medford, NY 
• Montgomery County, MD   • Rhode Island 
• Washington, DC    • Chicago, IL 
• Cromwell, CT    • Baltimore, MD 
• Fairfield County, CT   • Watchung, NJ 
• Hartford, CT    • Milwaukee, WI 
• New Haven, CT    • W. Danbury, CT 
Expansion Timeline (“Peapod Company History,” n.d.): 
1990 Evanston, IL 
1991 Evanston surrounding suburbs and Chicago 
1993 San Francisco, CA 
1995 Columbus, OH 
1996 Boston metro area 
1997 Watertown, MA 
1998 Long Island, NY 
2000 Norwalk, CT and Washington, DC 
2001 Virginia and Maryland 
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2002 Cape Cod, MA (closed 5 markets not strategic to Royal Ahold: Columbus, Dallas, 
Houston, Austin and San Francisco) 
2003 Hartford, CT and New Haven, CT 
2004 Rhode Island, Mt. Vernon, NY, Baltimore, MD, Cromwell, CT. and Watchung, NJ 
2005 Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Danbury, CT, Wanaque, NJ and Somerset, NJ 







Safeway Delivery Areas 
• Northern California: San Francisco, Marin, Greater North Bay, East Bay,  
• Sacramento, San Jose, Peninsula, Monterey, Salinas  
• Portland, OR  
• Seattle, WA  
• Greater Phoenix, AZ  





         Appendix G 
Regular Peapod Delivery Fee 
The following table shows the regular delivery fees for Peapod residential and 
business customers: 
Table 2 Peapod Delivery Fee 
Residential  
Minimum order amount: 
$50.00 
Over $100.00: $6.95 
($75.00-$100.00: $7.95 
Chicago and Washington, DC only) 
$50.00-$100.00 (Less than $75.00 for Chicago and 
Washington, DC): $9.95 
Business 
Minimum order amount: 
$75.00 
Over $150.00: $11.95 
Less Than $150.00: $17.95 




Comparisons of Operational Strategies of Peapod, Te sco, Safeway, FreshDirect, 
Webvan and Streamline 
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i Competition in the US retail food industry has grown stiffer, due to lifestyle changes of consumers and 
the aging of the population. Traditional supermarkets continue to fight for market share with new players, 
such as discounters, drug stores, dollar stores, farmer’s markets and CSAs (community-supported 
agriculture). With online pure-play grocers now joining them, according to CIBC (Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce) World Markets, traditional supermarket chains have been steadily losing market share. In 
1999, supermarkets sold 82.2% of food, discounters sold 7.9%, and dollar stores sold 2.6%.  By 2004, 
supermarkets were down to 75.8% market share, discounters were up to 12.7%, and dollar stores were 
up to 4%.  Wal-Mart is seen as one of the major threats to the existing supermarkets (Anonymous, 2005). 
In 2006, the top four food retailers in the United States were Wal-Mart, Kroger, Albertsons, and Safeway 
(Green, 2006). Online grocery ordering and delivery provides a new distribution channel for brick & mortar 
stores. Driven by market pressure, supermarkets welcome this new competitive edge that would help 
them maintain, and even gain market share against competitors. 
